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ABSTRACT 
The rising cost of U.S. Naval Ships and the rate of change in technology require a 
thorough analysis of current shipbuilding practices. The Navy wants the latest and 
greatest technology, while at the same time keeping overall cost low. Some technologies 
are obsolete before completion of the ship’s design and construction. A design locked in 
at Critical Design Review (CDR) undergoes multiple modifications prior to ship’s 
delivery. Design changes drive up cost. The goal is to provide the Warfighter Battlespace 
Dominance while keeping cost low enough to allow a consistent purchase of additional 
ships. 
To accomplish this goal, both industry and the Navy must be aware of what is 
driving design changes and willing to revise existing practices. The objectives of this 
thesis are to identify the major sources of rework and to suggest modifications and 
improvements to existing practices. A review of DoD Acquisition and the Shipbuilding 
process identifies design changes resulting from requirements volatility, inconsistent 
execution of Defense Acquisition, and the rigidity of the design and construction process 
as major sources of rework. Recommendations include improving change management, 
optimizing the schedule for resilience, and the use of a modular open systems approach to 
reduce rework. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The rising cost of U.S. Naval Ships and the rate of change in technology require a 
thorough analysis of current shipbuilding practices. The Navy wants the latest, most 
effective, technology while at the same time keeping overall cost low. Some technologies 
may become obsolete before a ship can be designed and constructed. A design locked in 
at Critical Design Review (CDR) is likely to be modified multiple times prior to ship’s 
delivery. Design changes drive up cost, but not changing the design may result in 
delivery of a new ship with outdated technologies. The goal is to provide, to the 
Warfighter, battle space dominance while keeping the overall cost low enough to allow a 
consistent purchase of additional ships. 
To accomplish this goal, both the shipbuilding industry and the Navy must be 
aware of design change drivers and be willing to revise existing practices. A review of 
the current ACAT I ship programs listed on the Department of the Navy Research, 
Development & Acquisition website shows that most programs involve procurement of 
multiple ships. Multi-ship procurement is considered a cost saving method because it 
allows use of “Economic Order Quantity” material purchases and reaps the benefits of 
shipbuilder’s lessons learned and the learning curve effect. But, if ship design is locked 
down at Critical Design Review (CDR), and it takes five to seven years to build a ship, 
then it is obvious that design modifications are inevitable if the desire is to prevent 
delivery of obsolete technology. 
Ship design and construction consists of multiple tasks that feed other tasks in a 
highly complex and interdependent flow. The physical location of compartments and 
equipment dictates, to some degree, when they should be constructed. Disruption in the 
order of sequenced work tasks often causes rework and reduced productivity. The ship 
specifications and other documents provided at the beginning of the shipbuilding contract 
are vital to supporting these scheduled tasks. If information is missing or ambiguous,  
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design and construction involving the related area may be delayed. Construction in 
unaffected areas continues at the original scheduled pace. The result is out of sequence 
work.  
On the other hand, if the specifications and other documents provided at the 
beginning of the contract are expected to support the design and construction of multiple 
ships, the result would be a new ship with obsolete technology. Immediately after 
delivery, the ship would undergo a technology refresh involving the rip-out and 
replacement of the ship’s initial systems. Where is the cost savings in that? Finding new 
methods for dealing with out of sequence work must be explored, but that alone will not 
be enough. Even if multi-ship procurement offsets the cost of out of sequence work and 
replacement of obsolete technology, the waste of manpower and material still needs to be 
addressed. Acquisition methods preserving the benefits of multi-ship procurement 
without causing rework are needed. Improvements in these two areas would provide a 
cost savings and prevent the waste of delivering and then replacing obsolete technology. 
B. PURPOSE 
The research investigates the implementation of Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition practices in Naval Shipbuilding Projects, in particular, the development of 
requirements leading to design and construction. Experience and research demonstrate 
the negative impact of changing requirements, sub-optimal design activity sequencing, 
and production identified defects. Theoretical costs are quantified and alternatives 
analyzed. The objective is the development of modifications and improvements to 
existing acquisition and shipbuilding practices.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The implementation of DoD acquisition practices in Naval Shipbuilding Projects, 
in particular, the development of requirements leading to design and construction, 
directly affects the follow on design and construction activities. The following questions 
were addressed in order to understand the issues: 
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1. What are the major causes of rework? 
2. How can requirements volatility and associated rework be reduced? 
3. How can the quantity and cost of design changes after start of detail 
design and construction be reduced? 
4. How to provide the latest and greatest technology without incurring the 
high cost of out of sequence work? 
5. Is it more cost effective to proceed with an unstable design or delay the 
start of design and construction? 
6. Is it more cost effective to use an event driven or schedule driven process? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis demonstrates the elasticity of the current DoD/Shipbuilder approach to 
design and construction as well as the effects of changes. The information identifies the 
potential for process improvement and cost savings. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The thesis analyzes Naval Shipbuilding projects from Milestone A, technology 
demonstration, through system development, construction, and delivery. The emphasis is 
on the time phasing of project and contractor activities and their effects. The expected 
maturity of each step in the process is analyzed for leading indicators of follow-on 
performance. The thesis targets opportunities created by current acquisition guidance, 
practices, and behaviors. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Navy ship acquisition is a complex activity undertaken over extended 
periods. The number and extent of issues influencing the results of ship acquisitions is 
enormous. Consider the billions of dollars in funds, the interests of the public, their 
representatives, contractors, their shareholders/employees, Navy leadership, and 
Warfighters. There is no end to the permutations of programs and performance. 
This variety of interests is synthesized with DoD acquisition management rigor to 
create the programs of today and the future. It is important to view the DoD acquisition 
model with a mind open to the effects of all the related interests and their varying power 
to influence outcomes. 
PEO Ships is the largest of five Program Executive Offices (PEO).The PEO Ships 
Web site provides a good overview of how they manage the acquisition of non-nuclear 
U.S. Navy surface vessels, excluding aircraft carriers 
(http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/program.htm). In addition to acquisition, they manage full 
lifecycle support for in-service vessels. Their responsibilities include research and 
development, acquisition, systems integration, construction, lifetime support and in some 
cases deactivation and disposal.  
PEO Ships reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA) regarding acquisition management and to the 
commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) regarding support for in-
service vessels. The DoD 5000 Series Directives provide the direction for implementing 
and progressing through the Defense Acquisition Lifecycle. The Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework, established by DoD Instruction Number 5000.2 (DoDI 
5000.2), consists of the Milestones, Phases, and Efforts used to determine a program’s 
status and readiness to progress to the next stage of development.   
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The DoD acquisition model formalizes the path from the recognition of a military 
need through the eventual disposal of those systems that fulfill that need. It is not a 
guarantor of technical success, though it delivers best practice approaches to improve the 
probability of success by programmatic and technical means. The process review is 
necessary to see the potential for modifications to enhance ship acquisition performance, 
with its peculiar demands. 
B. REVIEW OF DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS MODEL 
The Defense Acquisition Management Framework spans the lifecycle of the 
program from concept development to disposal. The framework is divided into Pre-
Systems Acquisition, Systems Acquisition, and Sustainment. All three activities have 
been explored briefly, but the research concentrated on the activities commencing after 
Pre-Systems Acquisition. As shown in Figure 1, these three activities are further broken 
down into five phases: Concept Refinement; Technology Development; System 
Development & Demonstration; Production & Deployment; and Operations & Support 
(DoDI 5000.2, 2003). Each phase has entrance and exit criteria, with most requiring 
action from the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 
 
Figure 1.  The Defense Acquisition Management Framework (From: DoDI 5000.2, 
2003) 
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1. Concept Refinement Phase 
The purpose of the Concept Refinement Phase is to refine the initial concept 
outlined in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and to develop a Technology 
Development Strategy (TDS) for guidance through the next phase. The ICD guides the 
effort in this phase, as well as the initial efforts in the Technology Development Phase. 
The entrance to this phase depends on an approved ICD, an approved plan for conducting 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and phase funding. The phase exits upon Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) approval of a preferred solution and the TDS (DoDI 5000.2, 
2003). 
2. Technology Development Phase 
The Technology Development Phase focuses on reducing the technology risk. An 
iterative approach is implemented to develop and evaluate technologies to satisfy the 
system requirements. This phase begins after the Milestone A decision approving the 
TDS. The goal of using the AoA is to determine the appropriate technologies to address, 
the capabilities identified in the ICD within a reasonable amount of time. The phase exits 
after the demonstration of an affordable increment of militarily useful capability in a 
relevant environment. As previously noted, the system must also be capable of being 
developed in a short timeframe. The Capability Development Document (CDD) is a 
product of the Technology Development Phase. The Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB) and CDD establish the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) used throughout the 
ensuing program to measure system performance. The technology development phase 
may also coincide with ship program initiation to permit concurrent design activities 
(DoDI 5000.2, 2003).  
Configuration management of the developing functional design and allocated 
baselines rises in formality, as their maturity is determined during reviews. This phase 
provides the opportunity to manipulate and change significant system conceptual design 




etc. These changes may be viewed generally as strategic, so while implementing them in 
the baseline may not be challenging, they can have profound effects on the downstream 
design cost, schedule, and performance. 
3. System Development & Demonstration (SDD) Phase 
The System Development & Demonstration Phase consists of the System 
Integration (SI) and the System Demonstration (SD) efforts. This phase begins after 
approval of Milestone B and starts the System Acquisition activities. The selected 
technologies are presented in the preliminary design effort. The design is matured 
through Preliminary Design Review (PDR), to Critical Design Review (CDR), and 
ultimately Production Readiness Review (PRR). SI begins during preliminary and critical 
design periods (DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
The SI effort involves integrating demonstrated subsystems and components in an 
effort to reduce risk. The entrance criteria require a technical solution comprising 
subsystems that have not yet been integrated into a complete system, phase funding, and 
an approved CDD. The integration activities typically include demonstration of prototype 
articles or Engineering Development Models (EDMs). Demonstration of prototypes or 
EDMs in a relevant environment, documentation of the system configuration, and a 
successful Design Readiness Review (DRR) are required prior to exiting this phase 
(DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
Successful completion of the DRR starts the SD effort, leading to the PRR and 
Milestone C. The SD effort demonstrates the ability of the system to operate in a useful 
manner consistent with the approved KPPs. The entrance criterion requires successful 
demonstration of the system in prototypes or EDMs. The demonstration activities include 
Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E), Operational Assessment (OA), Operational 
Test & Evaluation (OT&E), and preliminary Live Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E). The 
exit of the SD effort depends on the demonstration of the system using prototypes or 
EDMs in its intended environment; satisfactory measurement of the system’s 
performance against the KPPs; reasonable availability of industrial capabilities; and the 
determination that the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and Milestone C entrance 
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requirements. The flexibility of the framework allows a program to enter the acquisition 
cycle in either SI or SD with the successful completion of Milestone B (DoDI 5000.2, 
2003).  
During SDD, the design is maturing and configuration management (CM) of the 
requirements and specifications is formalized. Formal CM of the specifications is critical 
to demonstrating a stable design that will satisfy Milestone C requirements. At the same 
time, there is an expected capacity to identify needed changes or accept proposed 
improvements. Proposed changes, at this stage, directly affect cost, schedule and 
performance. The program employs technical and programmatic processes to evaluate 
these impacts and make appropriate decisions.  
4. Production & Deployment Phase 
The approval of Milestone C starts the Production and Deployment Phase, and 
represents the decision to commit the program to production. The purpose of the 
Production & Deployment Phase is to achieve the specified operational capability. 
Depending on requirements, authorization is for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), 
production, or procurement. If LRIP is required, a subsequent review and decision is 
needed to authorize full-rate production (FRP). 
Depending on the LRIP requirement, and if Milestone C is the program initiation, 
entrance factors may include: satisfactory performance in DT&E and OA; mature 
software capability; elimination of significant manufacturing risks; controlled 
manufacturing processes; an approved ICD; an approved Capability Production 
Document (CPD); acceptable interoperability; acceptable operational supportability; 
demonstration of system affordability throughout the life cycle; optimal funding, and 
phased rapid acquisition. LRIP for ships is production of items at the minimum quantity 
and rate feasible to sustain the production base. If LRIP is required, a Full-Rate 
Production Decision Review is conducted to consider the results of the IOT&E and 
LFT&E (if applicable); interoperability demonstrations; supportability demonstrations; 
cost and manpower estimates; and supportability and certification of command, control, 
communications, computer and intelligence (if applicable) (DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
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The Full-Rate Production and Deployment portion of the Production and 
Deployment Phase starts with the authorization given upon a favorable Full-Rate 
Production Decision Review. Focus is on producing and delivering the system to the field 
for operational use. Program Management oversight must insure the fielded system meets 
the user’s requirements specified in the CPD and that the system is produced at an 
economical rate. Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) may be conducted 
to assess the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability. Correction of deficiencies 
should be demonstrated as well. Since fielding of the first system starts the Operations 
and Support Phase, these two phases overlap (DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
As in the SDD phase, proposed changes directly affect cost, schedule, and 
performance. After production and procurement start, the effects are magnified. The 
further along in production, the more risk a change will create excessive impacts due to 
waste, rework, and rescheduling (Storch, Hammon, Bunch, & Moore, 1995). 
5. Operations & Support Phase 
Full Operational Capability (FOC) is achieved during the Operations & Support 
Phase. Logistics and operational readiness are the main focus of this phase. 
Supportability is provided over the life of the system. This includes monitoring the 
system status to ensure the user’s needs are still being met. The Operations & Support 
phase is divided into Sustainment and Disposal (DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
The Sustainment portion starts immediately upon fielding or deployment of the 
first system. Its purpose is to provide the necessary supplies and services to maintain 
operational readiness and operational capabilities. Activities include executing 
operational support plans, conducting modifications and upgrades to hardware and 
software, and measuring customer satisfaction (DoDI 5000.2, 2003). 
The end of a ship’s useful life results in decommissioning and in some cases 
transfers or sales to friendly foreign navies. If a ship is not transferred or sold, it must be 




health requirements. The activities required to demilitarize and dispose of the system are 
managed in the Disposal portion of the Operations and Support Phase (DoDI 5000.2, 
2003). 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The DoD acquisition process provides a roadmap for following the evolution of a 
ship concept into design and, ultimately, construction and delivery. The relationship of 
the design to the program and construction status is the basis for an analysis of potential 
issues related to design volatility and its effect on cost and schedule. So far, the 
description is of the high-level DoD acquisition model. Grasping the intent of the model 
is critical to understanding the relationship between the volatility of design maturity to 
cost and schedule impacts. 
From Milestone A until delivery, there is a continuum of design development and 
maturation into which changes, or corrections, appear to have an ever-increasing direct 
effect. In addition, the early period holds the potential for significant downstream impact. 
Of particular interest is the relative consequence of volatility to the acquisition process, 
both technically and programmatically. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF SHIPBUILDING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Shipbuilding utilizes highly complex processes to design and construct built-to-
order products that meet customer requirements. This requires continuous interaction 
between the customer, the shipyard, suppliers, and governing bodies. The shipbuilding 
process involves concurrent design, engineering, planning, scheduling, and 
manufacturing throughout the entire project. As such, coordination of all activities is 
critical to successful on time, and within budget completion. 
Knowing the dependencies of these tasks is critical to managing the project. The 
effects of design changes grow over time. Even though these effects are greatest during 
the construction phase, this chapter reviews all stages starting with the pre-contract 
activities: preliminary concept design, contract design and bidding/contracting. A more 
detailed review of the shipbuilding management cycle follows explaining the activities 
after contract award. Group Technology, as applied to shipbuilding, is the management 
approach presented. 
B. PRELIMINARY-CONCEPT DESIGN 
Preliminary-Concept Design analyzes and defines basic requirements in response 
to the customer’s needs or perceived needs. The work breakdown structure (WBS) used 
during this time is systems oriented. The primary activities are the control and 
development of ship design through drawing and document development and design 
verification. Outputs of the preliminary-concept design define the contract design 
baseline. 
Preliminary design decomposes performance requirements into the appropriate 
level of physical or functional abstraction. The architecture of the requirements, 
specifications, and related systems are developed. An example is mobility. A speed 
requirement is a partial decomposition of the system’s mobility needs. The speed 
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requirement is then decomposed, or allocated, to the hull form and the propulsive force 
needed to achieve required speed. This is a concurrent architecture development of the 
need for propulsion and hull design. The requirements decomposition continues until the 
specification is developed. 
In the example, a specification may be “the ship shall have two prime movers of 
XXX horsepower each.” Alternatively, “the hull form shall have less than XXX 
resistance to motion in sea state 0.” The Critical Design Review locks in the ship 
specifications and requirements in the form of the contract data package. 
C. CONTRACT DESIGN 
Contract Design includes the preparation of drawings and specifications required 
to provide sufficient information for bid development, contract negotiation and the start 
of ship detail design. The contract documents depict the contractual configuration for the 
procured ship and listings of additional guidance documents required for development of 
the detail design drawings. Examples of the additional documents or information include 
the following: 
Schedule A – A listing of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), by system, 
including quantity and delivery dates.  
Schedule C – A listing of Government Furnished Information (GFI), by system, 
including drawing numbers, drawing revisions and delivery dates. 
GFI provides the detailed information needed for developing the detail design 
drawings in the case of GFE. Vendor Furnished Information (VFI) provides the detail for 
vendor furnished equipment. The combination of contract documents and GFI/VFI 
provide the detail required for detail design. Any changes to these documents after 
contract award constitutes design change and may be subject to a cost and or schedule 
adjustment. 
D. BIDDING/CONTRACTING 
Using the contract documents and the provided delivery dates for milestones and 
GFI/GFE, the shipyard develops a response to the Request for Proposal (RFP). 
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Specification of equipment and requirements provide a basis for cost estimations. The 
contract price is decided and vessel delivery dates are established. This requires close 
coordination between the project development team, cost estimation team, planning, and 
supply chain management.  
Preliminary planning occurs between the bidding process and contract award. At 
this time, dates for major events such as start fabrication, lay keel, launch, and delivery 
are established. In addition, development of a preliminary build strategy provides 
construction guidelines and becomes the basis for detail design, preliminary production 
schedules, and resource allocations. Planning is heavily involved in this stage of the 
process and is responsible for estimation of production hours and time. The estimates 
reflect shipyard facility capacities, existing production workloads/schedules, and 
availability of facility lay down space. 
E. THE MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
The management cycle in the shipbuilding process starts with estimating, and then 
moves into the planning, scheduling, execution and evaluation phases. The transitions 
displayed in Figure 2, illustrate the need for both a systems and product or zone oriented 
grouping in the work breakdown structure (Storch, 1995). The cycle starts out using a 
systems orientation for estimating and early planning (including design). It then 
transitions to a zone orientation for additional planning, scheduling, execution, and initial 
testing. Another transition is required to provide a systems view for the overall test and 
evaluation. This transitional approach is the basis for group technology in the 
shipbuilding process.  
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Figure 2.  System and Zone Orientation in Management Cycle (From: Storch, 1995) 
F. GROUP TECHNOLOGY 
The actual construction involves many interrelated tasks that start with converting 
raw materials, such as steel, into interim products. These interim products are then 
available for use in the next higher assemblies. Each task depends on the proper 
execution of the relevant preceding tasks. The management approach employed by the 
shipyard determines the division and grouping of tasks. One example is Group 
Technology (GT). 
GT is a method for managing industrial processes using an efficient 
“classification and coding system” (Storch, 1995). The philosophy is to divide the 
product, based on the classification criteria, into smaller, manageable, interim products. 
The resources, including personnel, and the processes required to produce the interim 
product make up a “cell” (Storch, 1995). These interim products are then combined “to 
make a new larger product” (Shenoi, 2006). 
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The classification and coding system used determines division of work in 
development of an interim product. Two such systems are the Ship Work Breakdown 
Structure (SWBS) and the Product-Oriented Work Breakdown Structure (PWBS). GT 
applied to shipbuilding uses both, depending on the stage in the management cycle. This 
section explains the differences between the two and their relationship to the management 
cycle. It starts by explaining GT, and then addresses a shipbuilding approach that 
involves integration of hull construction, outfitting and painting. 
The SWBS is a systems-oriented structure used by the Navy. It breaks down the 
ship in to functional systems. Prior to the decline in shipbuilding, the SWBS was the 
primary classification and coding system used throughout the lifecycle of the ship. Tasks 
requiring a systems view such as estimating, preliminary design, and overall test and 
evaluation still use the SWBS. However, the structure defined by the PWBS more 
accurately reflects the actual production of the ship. Figure 3 shows a shipbuilding 
classification and coding system based on the SWBS. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Shipbuilding Classification and Coding System (From: 
http://www.sesnet.soton.ac.uk/degpro/SESS2002/SESS2002_lecture_notes.htm) 
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GT supports production activities by using the PWBS for the classification and 
coding system. Parts are procured, fabricated and then joined together to create interim 
parts or subassemblies during the production stages of the ship. GT provides all of the 
resources required, including personnel, to complete a subassembly without concern for 
functional systems. Production of various subassemblies occurs simultaneously. These 
subassemblies are then grouped with the tasks and resources required to build the next 
higher subassemblies and so on. This grouping continues until all interim products are 
integrated, presenting a complete ship. The lowest level of these interim products is a 
zone. 
Shipbuilding consists of many tasks that require construction processes as 
opposed to manufacturing processes. Many interim products are one or few of a kind. GT 
uses the PWBS to realize some of the benefits a manufacturing company realizes with 
mass production by identifying “relative permanency of location and function, moving 
work to the worker, balanced product flow, etc.,” (Storch, 1995). The idea is that an 
efficient classification system provides a tool that makes it easier to organize the required 
resources, thereby increasing productivity. 
GT reduces the amount of inventory for in-process work by arranging work areas 
into cells. Cells are scheduled and loaded with parts based on the classification criteria. 
Shapes, material and size, among others, are all attributes used in defining a cell. Setting 
up cells to produce interim products based on similar criteria reduces the amount of 
handling required for parts, as well as, the amount of setup time required for various 
machines used throughout the production process (Storch, 1995). 
With the decline in shipbuilding, it was determined that the SWBS and other such 
systems lacked the ability to organize work in a manner conducive to the actual 
production process (Todd Shipyards, 1986). Work packages derived from a system 
function did not provide a clear division of work between fabrication and assembly 
processes. In addition, many of the shipboard systems typically spanned a vast area of the 
ship. This made production control and monitoring easier said than done (Todd 
Shipyards, 1986). Group Technology, as applied to shipbuilding, uses both the SWBS 
and the PWBS to manage the shipbuilding processes. 
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The PWBS utilizes a combination of product description (material type, quantity, 
location, size, etc.) and product control attributes (fabrication, assembly, erection 
techniques, etc) for classification and coding. Division of attributes for interim products 
falls into the following five basic categories and provides the basis for the six-character 
PWBS code (Todd Shipyards, 1986): 
Work Type – Identifies work required for a given interim product. (1st – 
character) 
Manufacturing Level – Identifies work sequence for a given work type. (2nd – 
number) 
Zone Type – Identifies production objective within a given manufacturing level. 
(3rd – number) 
Problem Area – Identifies work requirements within a given zone. (4th/5th – 
number) 
Stage – Identifies work sequence for a given problem area. (6th – number) 
Reviewing an approach that applies the PWBS classification and coding system 
provides an understanding of how GT relates to shipbuilding. The approach divides the 
initial shipbuilding process into three distinct work types: Hull Block Construction 
Method (HBCM), Zone Outfitting Method (ZOFM), and Zone Painting Method (ZPTM). 
Further sub-division defines fabrication and assembly processes. 
Classification Trees or the PWBS Classification and Coding book provide the 
source for selecting the appropriate code for each of the five basic categories. The 
process produces a six-character code used to identify and describe interim products. 
Once accomplished, resources required for interim products are identified. Required 
resources include material, manning, facilities location for manufacturing process, 
equipment and tools required for task assignments, transportation to move interim 
product to the next stage of production, overhead support such as material runners to 





Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide examples of the classification trees used in the 
development of work packages (U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT] Maritime 
Administration, & Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation, 1986). The PWBS Classification 
Tree, figure 4, illustrates the initial breakdown of distinctive work types for parts and/or 
interim products in the shipbuilding process. 
 
Figure 4. PWBS Classification Tree (After: http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA452827&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) 
 
The Hull Block Construction Method (HBCM) divides the shipbuilding system 
into production blocks that have the same or similar type work and utilizes the same work 
process. The goal is to divide the ship system into workable units that maximize 
outfitting and painting of units (blocks) prior to hull erection. Figure 4 shows the HBCM 
Classification Tree used to derive the PWBS classification and coding for work types 
designated as HBCM (DOT, 1986). Zone Outfitting and Zone Painting use the same logic 
as the Hull Block Construction Methods by organizing outfitting and painting processes 
by zone and staging the work into on-unit, on-block and on-board work packages. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the ZOFM and the ZPTM Classification Trees respectively (DOT, 
1986). Using Group Technology with the PWBS Classification and Coding allows for 
maximum productivity throughout the overall construction process. 
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Figure 7.  ZPTM Classification Tree (After: http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA452827&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) 
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G. DETAIL DESIGN AND PLANNING 
Detail design, planning, and procurement begin after contract award. The 
shipbuilder determines detailed construction procedures and methods for ship 
construction, during this phase of the shipbuilding process. Requirements identified in the 
bidding and contracting phase provide the basis for determination. Resources are 
allocated, both material and staffing, and expected completion times are established. The 
detail design phase uses the ship specifications, contract drawings and GFI or VFI to 
create detailed drawings needed for construction. 
First, development of system level drawings and analyses ensure the design is as 
intended and will perform to requirements. Production level drawings result from 
drawing development after design validation. Planning for production begins in the 
preliminary design process. As noted earlier, the initial design and planning activities use 
the SWBS orientation and then transition to PWBS. This is apparent when reviewing the 
four primary design stages: 
Basic Design – output is usually contract documents specifying the make up of 
the ship as a total system and a preliminary build strategy. 
Functional Design – output is usually system diagrams and key plans, including 
list of materials by system. 
Transition Design – output is a regrouping of the system’s information to provide 
drawings organized by zones. 
Work Instruction Design – output is the more detailed information about the 
particular interim product used for classification and coding. 
Figure 8 depicts the process involved in the development of work packages. The 
integration of planning, using an iterative approach, strives to ensure these packages are 
suitable for production. The preliminary or basic design phase produces an initial build 
plan using the contract documents and provided milestones. The build plan identifies the 
particular capabilities of the shipyard, along with modifications and/or capital 
investments required to complete the project. Using the shipyard’s experience, the build 
plan considers block breakdowns, the layout of processing lanes and other best practices 
to establish production precedence early in the design process (Storch, 1995). 
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Figure 8.  Work Package Development Process (After: Storch, 1995) 
 
Functional Design is the phase of the detail design, where contract design outputs 
develop into full technical specifications, final hull parameters are developed, major 
equipment vendors selected, systems requirements refined, and sufficient detailed design 
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information collected. The finalization of design schedules, budgets and required 
manufacturing deliverables enables transition to the design development phase. 
The notional integrated master plan developed during contract design provides the 
basis for an integrated ship design and construction plan. Constraints requiring an overlap 
between ship design and construction drive the requirements for this plan. The integrated 
plan takes into consideration contract milestones, delivery dates, available facilities, and 
the type, size and construction methods of the ship to develop a parts fabrication 
schedule, build sequence and integration schedule. A material schedule is then developed 
based on the required need date and lead-time for all material including the major vendor 
supplied equipment. 
The transitional design phase of the detail design process shifts from a ship-wide 
systems engineering approach to a modular, or zone focused approach, based on the build 
strategy selected for production. The detail design also shifts from an engineering focus 
to a fabrication based product model focus. The majority of the design and verification 
takes place in the transition design phase.  
The work instruction design phase extracts all engineering data embedded in the 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Product Models as production drawings. Mold loft 
work usually begins in this phase. It entails the development of Numerical Controls (N/C) 
data for burning, steel parts programming, and the development of templates (Storch, 
1995). The information extracted from the production drawings includes bills of material 
and any other available numerical control data used to control machines automatically. 
Configuration control is critical in this phase. Proper execution of the 
manufacturing process depends on having the latest data, baseline consistency between 
related drawings, and the proper accountability of design changes in the manufacturing 
process.  
H. PLANNING, SCHEDULING, AND PRODUCTION CONTROL 
The shipbuilding process involves procurement of tons of raw materials and 
thousands of components. It requires the manufacturing of thousands of parts from raw 
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material and the assembly of manufactured parts and components into assemblies, blocks, 
and grand blocks. As such, very complex and detailed planning is required and must be 
coordinated with engineering in the early stages of the design process. 
As stated previously, preliminary planning occurs between the bidding process 
and contract award. Particular attention to the customer’s requirements is necessary. As 
the process moves into detail design, the decision makers determine what parts, 
assemblies, and systems are to be built and/or purchased. Determination of the facility 
layouts, construction methods, subcontracting, sequencing of operations, manufacturing 
and workforce utilization is also required. 
During this stage, production engineers define the size and weight of blocks as 
allowed by shipyard capabilities. The planning department directs the selection of 
assembly and erection processes that are consistent with safety regulations and the 
identification of preliminary zones, problem areas, staging areas and work packages for 
block assembly and parts manufacturing. The objective of planning is to simplify work as 
much as possible in an effort to increase productivity by shifting work to the 
“manufacturing stages where it is safer and easier to perform” (Storch, 1995). 
An example is outfitting on-unit as compared to on-block. On-unit is an in-house 
zone, such as a shop, independent of the hull structure, where the arrangement of fittings 
are defined and assembled. Outfitting on-block refers to the assembly of fittings on any 
hull structural subassembly. A ceiling in the on-block zone is set upside-down to 
facilitate ease of welding. The outfitting process is more productive when conducted in a 
shop than on-block due to space limitations and potential interference with the multiple 
crafts involved in the process. 
Likewise, outfitting on-block is far more productive than outfitting on-board, 
which occurs during hull erection and after launch. It is easier to perform different weld 
techniques on ceilings while an assembly is in the upside-down position as opposed to 
welding overheard on-board with the unit in the up position (Storch, 1995). “Whether 
such work is effectively planned and finally incorporated in zone/problem area/stage  
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work instructions depends on how well designers and production engineers communicate 
with each other, beginning in basic design and continuing throughout the entire design 
process” (Storch, 1995). 
The planning phase determines all required jobs and job sequencing. As part of 
the planning process, material, manpower, workstations, cost estimations and job 
durations are developed within the framework of the master construction schedule. The 
shipbuilding master schedule provides dates for start fabrication, keel, launch, and 
delivery for contracted and/or potential ship construction within a reasonable period. The 
outcome is a design department master, which controls the sequence of other design 
schedules.  
The Planning and Scheduling department is responsible for the detailed build 
strategy along with the master plan, which establishes need dates for major equipment 
and procurement plans. Planners then refine the master plan to lower level production 
schedules, which allow for proper planning and managing of shipyard resources such as 
facility layout plans, shop loading, manning plans and sub-contractor activities.  
Scheduling methods generally reflect best practices developed from lessons 
learned. A network flow diagram provides an overall schedule of task and events to both 
management and production, which illustrates the sequence of work and the task 
relationships to the shipbuilding project (The Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers [SNAME], 1980). 
The basic principle in network flow is the task-to-task with a task- to-time 
relationship. An example is that task C cannot start until its prerequisite tasks are 
complete. Some examples of the Network Flow Scheduling Technique are the Program 
Evaluation and Review Technology (PERT) and the Critical Path Method (CPM). Both 
examples provide a means of representing graphically the different tasks that are required 
for a project. Revised networks show the impact of adjustments to a schedule resulting 
from design changes and schedule delays. It is also possible to determine the shortest and 
longest probable time for project completion. Figure 8 shows a Critical Path Method 
network for a small portion of an overall ship schedule.  
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Figure 9.  Scheduling Network for Critical Path Method (From: Storch, 1995) 
 
It is important to keep networks simple as well as practical and to eliminate 
insignificant tasks; otherwise, the network will become unmanageable and not add value 
to the shipbuilding project. Revising schedules requires a new critical path to be 
developed. It is also important to mention that in the shipbuilding process, there will be 
more than one critical path and that each department will have its own critical tasks 
relative to the production process. 
I. CONSTRUCTION 
Start fabrication marks a major milestone in the shipbuilding process. It begins 
with production of steel parts and hull block manufacturing. This is a critical step in the 
production process as it is the foundation for all outfitting work. Any delays or failures 
influence downstream outfitting and assembly processes. Once production begins, it 
becomes extremely difficult to make modifications to existing technology, add new 
technology to the ship, and/or make schedule adjustments. Design changes or schedule 
delays because of poor planning and coordination of required resources may drive new 
requirements (Kanerva, Lietepohja, & Hakulinen, 2002). The Design Engineering phase 
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runs in concurrence with the production process. As such, the outputs of the design 
process must sufficiently identify material and production requirements to allow for 
procurement, planning, and scheduling to enable efficient manufacturing and installation 
of ship components (Kanerva, 2002). 
Pre-outfitting begins during the block and grand block assembly stages. This 
entails installation of piping, ladders, ventilation, insulation, cable, etc. Decisions on the 
extent of pre-outfitting is largely dependent on the time available for pre-planning, 
development work and equipment procurement. Increased pre-outfitting increases 
scheduling, design and construction problems such as component availability and 
protection against damage during and after hull erection. There must also be a high 
degree of accuracy in system layout and a carefully planned installation sequence to 
avoid lockouts and interferences, which would require rework or a design change to 
correct the problem (SNAME, 1980). Lockouts refer to the removal of temporary 
accesses, used for equipment installation, prior to installing equipment larger than any 
remaining access. This results in cutting another temporary access in a completed 
compartment. 
Typical shipyard construction tasks are not sequential and may occur at different 
times in the construction process (Kanerva, 2002):  
Steel preparation – is the process of cleaning and preparing steel parts or blocks 
for painting or corrosion control. Use of various techniques depends on the type 
of material prepared. 
Steel parts manufacturing – is the process of cutting and fabricating steel plates 
into panels and bent shells required for hull block assemblies. 
Outfitting component prefabrication – involves manufacture of piece parts and 
components required for outfitting. This includes items such as pipe, duct, 
electrical components, etc. 
Unit prefabrication – builds and outfits assemblies such as machinery spaces, 
which usually go through a series of tests prior to landing on-block. 
Block assembly – takes parts produced from the Steel manufacturing stage 
assembled into blocks. 
Block outfitting – takes parts produced in the outfitting component stage and/or 
purchased components for installation into block assemblies. 
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Grand Block assembly – joins pre-outfitting block assemblies to form larger 
blocks prior to hull erection. 
Grand Block outfitting – takes parts produced in the outfitting component stage 
and/or purchased components and continues outfitting on the grand block prior to 
hull erection. 
Hull Erection – begins with lay keel and is the process of landing and joining 
grand block assemblies at the construction-building site. 
Area Outfitting – once hull erection begins, the outfitting of parts produced in the 
outfitting component stage and/or purchased components continues using a zone 
area process. 
Test and Trials – demonstrates, through a series of tests, that all systems and 
equipment are properly installed and operable in accordance with contract 
requirements. 
The Production Control (PC) department is responsible for preparation of work 
packages and ordering of material required to complete the job and maintain even 
workloads throughout the various workstations within the construction process. They 
coordinate with other organizations to support production schedules on bill, test, and 
compartment completions, material status and labor loading of shops, control of docks 
and areas, major event status, critical path analyses, workarounds and work station 
transfers. PC identifies problems and acts as a liaison with other departments to provide 
resolutions. Due to working many aspects of ship construction concurrently, it is 
important to monitor the progress in order to know what is actually happening in the 
production process. PC typically performs this function. 
Material control is one of the most important functions in applying and 
controlling group technology in shipbuilding. Purchasing material and component parts 
necessary to ensure the flow of needed material to various workstations without 
overstocking requires careful scheduling and planning. Material Control is responsible 
for purchasing, requisitioning, expediting, warehouse, and delivery of material to the 




Figure 10.  Material relationship – Design/Procurement/Production (After: Storch, 1995) 
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Material lists identify equipment by system as well as zone, problem area and 
stage of production. Material control numbers identify type, grade and size required for 
procurement. Material cost classification numbers identify a system to allocate cost, a 
piece number which identifies by system where they appear in the design and a work 
package number to designate where it will be installed by zone/problem area/stage 
(Storch, 1995). 
As stated earlier, material control manages the warehousing function. It receives 
and stores material until receiving an order for palletizing and delivery to the workstation. 
The release and on-time delivery of material requires an advanced request, with sufficient 
time to allow for palletizing. Figure 11 illustrates this process flow (Storch, 1995). The 
goal of warehousing is to maintain an accurate count and physical control of material 
while minimizing handling and storage costs. 
 
Figure 11.  Functional flow of warehouse and palletizing (After: Storch, 1995) 
Accuracy Control monitors the construction of in-process work to minimize 
delays and rework. It involves the regulation of accuracy as a method for improving 
shipbuilding productivity by focusing on areas where significant benefits result from 
improvements in the process. Accuracy Control also provides visibility by individual 
work processes or problem areas and creates a quantitative feedback loop between 
production, planning, design, and engineering.  
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Accuracy Control involves the regulation of accuracy as a management technique 
for continuous improvement of the entire manufacturing system. To obtain productivity 
improvement, shipbuilders identify and prioritize problems. The statistical basis makes 
clear the relationship between cause and effect (DOT, 1985). 
Test and evaluation (T&E) starts in the early construction phase, with a detailed 
test schedule and commences with the successful demonstration of the ship’s systems 
during final contract trials. It consists of seven discrete stages of testing, with each stage 
building on the results of the previous one. Stage 1 tests are normally considered a 
function of the quality assurance department as opposed to T&E. DoD-STD-2106 (Navy) 
defines the seven stages of industrial testing as follows: 
Stage 1 – Material Receipt Inspection and Shop Tests. Normally considered a 
function of quality assurance as opposed to T&E, stage 1 tests intend to ensure 
receipt of equipment in good shape. They also facilitate inspection of new or 
repaired equipment prior to installation onboard ship. 
Stage 2 – Shipboard Installation Inspections and Tests. Stage 2 tests and 
inspections intend to ensure the proper installation of equipment prior to 
operation. 
Stage 3 – Equipment Tests. Stage 3 tests demonstrate the individual equipment 
performs within the established limits and tolerances. 
Stage 4 – Intra-system Tests. Stage 4 tests demonstrate that equipment and 
required functions, entirely within one independent system, perform within 
established limits and tolerances. 
Stage 5 – Inter-system Tests. Stage 5 tests demonstrate that two or more 
independent systems perform a specific function or functions within established 
standards. 
Stage 6 – Special Tests. Stage 6 tests, conducted as part of the dockside work 
package, require special simulation resources external to the immediate test 
organization. 
Stage 7 – Trial Tests. Stage 7 tests must be conducted during sea trials. 
Test procedures define the information required for validation and verification of 
the customer’s requirements, regulatory bodies’ regulations, and shipbuilder 
recommendations. They may be government or contractor furnished, generally depending 
on who provides the equipment. Usually systems that are vendor furnished require test 
procedures provided by the shipyard or a subcontractor. 
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Test conductors conduct tests in accordance with the test procedures and 
memorandum as systems are completed. The following provides a high-level overview of 
shipboard testing: 
Dockside Trials – tests conducted in order to ensure proper installation and hook 
up of systems in preparation for sea trials. Typical dockside testing consists of 
stage 2 – installation and inspection tests; stage 3 – initial equipment light off; 
stage 4 – intra-system tests; stage 5 – inter-system tests; and stage 6 – special 
tests. 
Builder’s Trials – at-sea tests conducted by the shipbuilder in order to locate and 
solve potential problems prior to Acceptance Trials. 
Acceptance Trials - official sea trial conducted with the customer, underway. 
Final Contract Trials – tests conducted after delivery of the ship in order to 
resolve open trial cards and discrepancies. 
Stage 3 unit or stand-alone tests may support the PWBS classification and coding. 
However, most test and evaluation activities require the transition back to the 
SWBS structure. The Management Cycle shown in Figure 2 illustrates the transition from 
zone orientation back to systems for the final evaluation period.  
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the course of investigating the overall shipbuilding process, significant overlap 
of design, planning, material procurement and production, as well as, functional systems 
and product aspects have been observed. Information exchange varies as the building of 
the ship advances but communication between the shipyard and all stakeholders is an 
ongoing process. Overlap in the design, planning, scheduling and construction processes 
are essential for reducing the construction period. However, it also reduces the time 
allowed to organize information developed by designers. Design information must be 
formatted to anticipate needs related to material and production requirements from the 
beginning stages.  
Lead-time required for design development and manufacturing of components 
increases with the level of sophistication, complicating the planning efforts. It is common 
practice to sub-contract small aspects of the ship to other shipyards or organizations to 
meet production schedules and need dates. Subcontractors may not be familiar with 
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current processes or construction details that occur during design synthesis. Without 
proper management, their effort could negatively affect concurrent shipyard activities. 
This adds complexity to the process, and reinforces the importance of early and accurate 
planning. 
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IV. DESIGN CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are many reasons for design changes throughout the design and 
construction of a ship. These changes result in additional work effort, even if not 
implemented. Changes often lead to rework. The timing of these changes can have a 
direct and cascading impact requiring additional labor hours, and increased material 
costs. With this in mind, it seems design change would be discouraged. Unfortunately, 
the time it takes to build a ship, and the rapid refreshing of technology, not only 
encourage design change, but also make it a necessity. 
The goal is to provide the Warfighter battle space dominance while keeping 
overall cost low enough to allow a consistent purchase of additional ships. Since some 
design changes are necessary, how can the impacts be minimized? It is important to 
understand what causes design changes and how the changes affect the ship design and 
construction process at different stages. Knowing the cause and magnitude of the impacts 
should provide a basis for determining which changes are necessary, and which do not 
provide a benefit outweighing the cost. 
Common sense dictates that it is less costly to change the placement of a window 
during design, prior to construction. It is much more expensive to remove a window from 
its initial location, after installation, and then relocate it. The timing of the design change 
has significant relevance to the impact on cost and schedule. A cost analysis should 
consider this. The benefit of moving the window from location A to location B may 
warrant the cost of change during the design phase. However, the dramatic cost increase 
associated with making the change after installation of the window in location A, may 
make the move infeasible. 
What constitutes design change? The more evident occurrence is changing from a 
previously specified item or system to a different item or system through some type of 
contract modification. Depending on the timing of the change, this results in rework of 
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specifications, drawings, planning, scheduling, and possibly construction and test. At a 
minimum, the change itself consumes resources associated with scoping and submitting a 
proposal. 
Lack of information is also a form of design change. Information missing during 
detail design results in reservations on a drawing required by a specific date to 
accommodate ship construction. Once provided, the designer uses the information to 
generate change documentation or a new revision of the drawing. This leads to updates in 
planning, scheduling, and possibly construction and test.  
In a 2005 survey conducted for the UK Ministry of Defense, RAND asked 
shipbuilders to identify key factors that led to program slippage. The survey included 
shipbuilders from the United Kingdom, United States and European Union identified in 
Table 1. RAND presented the six categories shown in Figure 12 and asked the 
shipbuilders to appropriate the percentage each contributed to schedule slippage for a 
total of 100%. The shipbuilders identified change orders/late product definition as the 
main contributors at 46%. Somewhat related to late product definition, lack of technical 
information, accounted for an additional 23% (Arena, Birkler, Schank, Riposo, & 
Grammich, 2005). 
 
UK Shipbuilders US Shipbuilders EU Shipbuilders
BAE Systems Bath Iron Works
Chantiers de l'Atlantique 
(France)
Babcock BES-Rosyth Electric Boat Fincantieri (Italy)
Devonport Management 
Ltd. Kvaerner Philadelphia IZAR (Spain)
Ferguson
National Steel and 
Shipbuilding Company Kvaerner Masa (Finland)
Swan Hunter




Vosper Thoryncroft  




Figure 12.  Causes of Schedule Slips Reported by Shipbuilders (From: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG235.pdf) 
The timing of the design change has a direct impact on cost and schedule. 
RAND‘s comparison of commercial change orders to military contract change orders by 
phases is shown in Figure 13. The analogy supports the view that changes occurring later 
in the program are more disruptive and have a much greater impact: 
Average value of total contract cost for changes associated with commercial 
contracts is 4%, and 8% for military. 
On average, changes incurred on commercial contracts usually take one to five 
weeks to resolve as compared with four to 22 weeks on military contracts. 
Roughly, 60% of changes on military contracts occur much later in the production 
phase of the contract, where as, more than half of design changes on commercial 
contracts occur in the early design phase. 
The cost of change as it occurs in the design phase is generally limited to the loss 
of design time because of the change. However, once production begins, the cost of 
change is more expensive because it leads to rework of previously completed ship 
construction tasks (Arena, 2005). 
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Figure 13.  Percentage of Total Number of Changes Occurring at Various Production 
Phases (From: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG235.pdf) 
 
The GAO analyzed the substantial cost growth on eight ships in the four classes 
comprising 96 % of the new ship construction budget in 2005. Their analysis attributes 
increases in labor hours and material costs for 78 % of the cost growth of these ships 
(United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005a). Table 2 from the GAO 
report lists the reasons cited, by the respective shipyards, for cost growth in labor hours 
(GAO, 2005a). Design changes are a common theme across all ship classes. 
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Case study ship Reasons for increase
DDG 91 ●  Inexperienced laborers
●  Design upgrades that result in rework
DDG 92 ●  Introduction of a new construction facility, setting workers
    back on the learning curve
●  Design upgrades that result in rework and workarounds
●  Strike increased number of hours needed to construct ship
CVN 76 ●  Less-skilled workers due to demands for labor on other
    programs at shipyard
●  Extensive use of overtime
●  Design changes resulting in rework
CVN 77 ●  Late material delivery results in delays and workarounds
●  Design changes resulting in rework
LPD 17 ●  Inexperienced subcontracted labor
●  Design difficulties led to doing work out of sequence and
    rework
●  Schedule delays
●  Bused workers to meet labor shortages
LPD 18 ●  Increases in LPD 17 translated into more hours for LPD 18
SSN 774 ●  Late material delivery
●  First in class design issues
SSN 775 ●  Quality problems and design changes
●  Inclusion of non-recurring labor hours
Sources: Shipbuilder (data); GAO (analysis).
 
Table 2.  Reasons Given by Shipbuilders for Labor Hours Cost Growth (After: 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-183) 
 
Current events provide several examples of the high number of design changes in 
today’s shipbuilding projects. In a testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, Philip Teel, Sector President of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, stated that 
5,750 design changes occurred between LHD 1 and LHD 2, with an average of 3,550 for 
each follow-on LHD (Teel, 2007). Teel provided notable metrics, which support the 
observation that cost growth in military ships is greater than that of commercial  
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shipbuilding projects, due to design modifications. Figure 14 illustrates the high number 
of design changes in both first of class military ships, and follow-on ships as compared to 
that of commercial ships (Teel, 2007). 
 
Figure 14.  Comparison of Military and Commercial Change Orders (From: 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SPEF032007/Teel_Testimony032007.pdf) 
 
Storch, Hammon, Bunch, and Moore (1995) provide an excellent overview of the 
theoretical, economical model of shipbuilding, while explaining the importance of 
maintaining an optimum production rate. Work packages are developed and scheduled to 
support construction of interim products. These interim products are then available for 
assembly in the next higher interim products and so on. The production rate varies over 
time depending on the resources required for the currently scheduled interim products. 
Planning and scheduling considers all of these dependencies when developing the 
work packages and schedules. Some slack time exists, but changes usually represent 
additional work, performed out of the normal sequence, and therefore affecting the 
schedule of other work packages (Storch, 1995). It is important to understand that design 
changes are major cost drivers due to the instability they introduce in maintaining an 
optimum production rate (Storch, 1995). 
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While some changes are necessary, many design changes are the result of 
avoidable issues. Inadequate requirements generation allows ambiguity to affect all 
follow on activities. This usually shows up during detail design and requires additional 
engineering and possibly programmatic effort to unravel the missing or incorrect 
information. Once the ship construction contract is signed, any changes in contract 
documentation or government/vendor furnished information is considered out of scope 
work and usually requires some type of cost adjustment. 
The acquisition process includes many reviews that attempt to minimize these 
types of risks. However, it is extraordinarily challenging to be accurate given the 
complexity of ship design and the politics surrounding the budget. This is evident when 
reviewing the vast number of change orders levied on the shipbuilder within a few 
months after signing a contract. LCS 1 faced an additional 14,000 new requirements, 
introduced by the Naval Vessel Rules, after contract award (Moosally, Moak, McCreary, 
Ellis, 2007). “This in turn drove many of the over 600 engineering changes on the lead 
ship” (Moosally, 2007). Figure 15 shows the disruption introduced by the design changes 
to LCS 1. 
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Figure 15. LCS 1 Master Schedule Including Design Change Impacts (From: 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SPEF_LCS020807/Industry_Testimony020807.pdf) 
 
In some cases, the customer believes changes will reduce cost. Their estimate 
includes only the reduction in material and labor costs to accomplish the initial scope of 
work. They fail to recognize the cost of the effort already expended to perform 
preliminary detail design, scheduling, planning, purchasing, and many other related tasks. 
The shipbuilder must recoup these costs, along with the cost to develop a bid package and 
negotiate the estimate to incorporate the change. 
If the customer has not put a “stop work” in place, work continues according to 
the initial contract. That means the cost of the change continues to grow during the time it 
takes to scope, negotiate, and authorize the change. These factors make estimating design 
changes complex, with risk that many impacts may be completely missed. They also 
show the need for understanding the desired change and its effect on ship design and 
construction, as well as the importance of communication between the customer and 
industry. 
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Often what seems like a small modification ends up cascading through several 
seemingly unrelated areas. An investigation of the sources of design changes, as well as 
their effects on cost, will provide insight into what design changes should be discouraged 
and what can better mitigate the effect by those that are necessary. 
B. SOURCES 
1. Requirements 
Until recently, ship performance and design requirements were decomposed from 
the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD described the high level, 
mission based requirements. The ultimate solution to the ORD requirements is the design, 
or contract data package, which contains the ship specification. For the shipbuilder, the 
ship specifications are the requirements. They are the specifications for building the 
ship. 
There is an obvious, compelling need for the ship specification to be clear, 
concise, and unambiguous. However, in the compressed environment of the specification 
development, their concurrent development may lead to inconsistencies that need 
correction. Over the development period, new technologies may require updates. The 
needs of National Defense may change, requiring updates to ship mission requirements, 
and therefore the ship specification.  
There are numerous causes of requirements change. These changes may originate 
with either the Navy or the shipbuilder. The shipbuilder generally proposes changes to 
clarify, disambiguate, correct errors, or improve producibility. The Navy typically 
proposes changes for the same reasons, as well as for mission, technology, affordability 
(remove capability), and political. The concern with requirements change is the effect on 
design; they are essentially a design change. Changes to requirements pose the risk of 
great impact on cost and schedule due to their direct influence on the design. The impact 
is not one of additional cost above the baseline; rather it is to the baseline not yet defined 
by the detail design and construction contract.  
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Requirements change may occur any time after Milestone A. Prior to Critical 
Design Review (CDR), activities analyzing and decomposing the ORD, or equivalent, 
contribute to the ship specification development. As the analysis matures, the stability of 
requirements makes possible the ship specification. This is a time of controlled volatility, 
with increasing configuration management until reaching CDR. Changes in this period 
indirectly affect rework when they create ambiguity and errors in the ship specification, 
or address the modifications improperly. While these changes may have dramatic cost 
and schedule ramifications, they do not generally require rework. The issue rather, is the 
total volatility of the specifications as the program prepares to strike a baseline at CDR. 
After CDR, with the exception of administrative changes, the issue is with the 
direct influence of changes on the design. As the detail design matures, changes initially 
create engineering and producibility/planning rework. After construction starts, the 
potential for engineering and construction rework magnifies the effect, including out of 
sequence complications. Therefore, there are two periods in which requirements change 
affects rework. Pre CDR, the effect is by total volatility. Post-CDR, the effect is based on 
the unique change. 
2. Technology Maturity 
The introduction of immature technologies into ship design and construction 
increases the risk for design change and out of sequence work. This continues to be 
common practice in DoD acquisitions. In the 1999 report, Better Management of 
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, the GAO assessed 
best practices on how to improve incorporation of new technology into weapon system 
programs. The report reviews experiences of both DoD and commercial technology 
development cases. 
Review of practices indicates that programs incorporating technologies with a 
high level of maturity are more likely to succeed. Programs that do not identify or resolve 
gaps in technology maturity, prior to product development, result in higher cost and 
schedule slippages (GAO, 1999). In order to avoid cost growth and delays, commercial 
firms make an important distinction between technology development and product 
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development (GAO, 1999). They practice managing a technology’s maturity to ensure it 
supports the intended product’s requirements prior to using it in product development 
(GAO, 1999). 
In its review, the GAO discovered that the commercial industry followed a 
disciplined process in achieving technology maturity. This is not the case for the DoD. 
Due primarily to budget constraints and pressures to provide unique performance 
capabilities at a low cost, the DoD is more likely to move immature and unproven 
technology into product development (GAO, 1999). Table 3 depicts a correlation of cost 
and schedule growth to lower Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) (GAO, 1999). 




launch Cost growth Schedule slippage
Commanche helicopter 101 percent* 120 percent*
   Engine 5
   Rotor 5
   Forward looking infrared 3
   Helmet mounted display 3
   Integrated avionics 3
BAT 88 percent 62 percent
   Accoustic sensor 2
   Infrared seeker 3
   Warhead 3
   Inertial measurement unit 3
   Data processors 3
Hughes HS-702 satellite None None
   Solar cell array 6
Ford Jaguar None None
   Adaptive cruise control 8
   Voice activated controls 8
Product development
*The Commanche, in particular, has experienced a great deal of cost growth and 
schedule slippage for many reasons, of which technology immaturity is only one. 
Other factors, such as changing the scope, funding, and pace of the program for 
affordability reasons, have also contributed.  
Table 3.  Cost and Schedule Experiences on Product Development (After: 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99162.pdf) 
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TRLs provide an assessment of the maturity level of evolving technologies. As 
outlined in Table 4 from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, TRLs range from two to 
nine, with the increase reflecting an increase in technology maturity. In the course of its 
study, the GAO found that technology insertion at program launch with a TRL of six to 
eight usually met cost, schedule and performance criteria. The study further revealed that 
technology used in commercial programs, prior to product launch, always fell into this 
category. Technology in DoD acquisitions prior to program launch rarely achieved a TRL 
greater than five. Using unproven technology in product development, the DoD programs 





1.  Basic principles 
observed and reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and 
development. Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology's basic properties. 
2.  Technology concept 
and/or application 
formulated. 
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. Applications are 
speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis 
to support the assumptions.  Examples are limited to 
analytic studies. 
3.  Analytical and 
experimental critical 
function and/or 
characteristic proof of 
concept. 
Active research and development is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment. 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that they will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system.  Examples 
include integration of "ad hoc" hardware in the laboratory. 
5.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
relevant environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be tested 
in a simulated environment. Examples include "high 





6.  System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated operational 
environment. 
7.  System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring 
demonstration of an actual system prototype in an 
operational environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, or 
space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed 
aircraft. 
8.  Actual system 
completed and qualified 
through test and 
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL 
represents the end of true system development. Examples 
include developmental test and evaluation of the system in 
its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design 
specifications. 
9.  Actual system proven 
through successful 
mission operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in 
operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions. 
Table 4.  Technology Readiness Level (After: 
https://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document) 
 
Unfortunately, an unchecked desire for the latest and greatest technology may put 
the program at risk. If the contract specifies a new technology but the technology does 
not mature prior to design, then design change is likely. As time elapses, the potential 
impact grows. The technology may mature, providing the information and products to 
incorporate in the ship’s design and construction. Alternatively, it may not, resulting in 
the fall back to a legacy solution. In either case, drawings, planning, schedules, and 
possibly construction and test are impacted. 
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Figures 16 and 17 show the processes for incorporating advanced technology into 
product development by the commercial industry and the DoD, respectively. They each 
use knowledge points to identify the level of maturity for use in product development. 
The timing and sequencing of these knowledge points highlights different views. 
Commercial industries credit successful launch and delivery of products to the 
level of knowledge and maturity associated with each phase in the cycle. The firms seek a 
mature technology prior to product launch. It shows a very clear distinction between 
Technology Development and Product Development, and the level of knowledge gained 
prior to production. Their model produces consistent reductions in production 








Figure 17.  DoD's Weapon System Acquisition Cycle (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99162.pdf) 
 
Figure 17 illustrates the DoD’s cycle for development of weapon systems. Unlike 
commercial firms, the level of knowledge for technology maturity, design maturity, and 
manufacturing process control, is still developing even as the weapon enters the 
production and fielding phase. The concurrency of these activities increases program risk, 
cost, and schedule. DoD does not make the clear distinction between technology 
development and product development made by commercial firms. Product development 
starts prior to technology maturity.  
The GAO’s comparison of the Commercial Industry to DoD led to the 
determination that “Maturity of Technology at Program Start is an Important Determinant 
of Success” (GAO, 1999). The report recommended, with concurrence from the DoD, 
that key technologies achieve a TRL of seven at established points in the process prior to 
commitment of cost, schedule and performance baselines. However, a 2005 GAO study 
indicates that the practice of incorporating immature technologies into weapon systems 
continues today: 
Poor execution of the revised acquisition policy is a major cause of DoD’s 
continued problems. DoD frequently bypasses key steps of the knowledge-
based process outlined in the policy, falls short of attaining key 
knowledge, and continues to pursue revolutionary—rather than 
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evolutionary or incremental—advances in capability. Nearly 80 percent of 
the programs GAO reviewed did not fully follow the knowledge-based 
process to develop a sound business case before committing to system 
development. Most of the programs we reviewed started system 
development with immature technologies, and half of the programs that 
have held design reviews did so before achieving a high level of design 
maturity. These practices increase the likelihood that problems will be 
discovered late in development when they are more costly to address. 
Furthermore, DoD’s continued pursuit of revolutionary leaps in capability 
also runs counter to the policy’s guidance. (GAO, 2005b) 
The report did not address ship programs, but it clearly shows that DoD continues 
to allow system development with immature technologies. Table 5 contains the data for 
23 programs initiated under the revised DoD Acquisition Policy. It clearly shows that 
several programs did not satisfy the requirements of the various acquisition milestones 
and checkpoints meant to control risk. For example, the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle did not have a Formal Milestone A review, 0% of the technology rated at least 
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Program 11/2001 Yes 100% 98% 0% 25%
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Cluster 1 6/2002 No 0% 28% 31% 44%
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Bomb 10/2003 Yes 100% 
Not 
available 0% 0%
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Radio System 





















































Sensor 7/2004 Yes 50% 39%b 45% 36%
B-2 Radar 
Modernization 
















Sources: DoD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 
Note: In this table the term "not available" means the GAO had not received sufficient 
data to make an assessment of the given program's design and/or technology maturity. 
*Milestone I was a forerunner to Milestone A, the decision review that currently 
precedes the start of technology development. 
bProgram office projections. 
cCost growth is expressed as the percent change in program development cost 
estimates in fiscal year 2005 dollars. 
Table 5.  Program Data for 23 Programs Initiated under DoD’s Revised Acquisition 
Policy (As of December 2005) (After: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06368.pdf) 
3. Engineering 
The previous sub-section captures various changes originating from engineering 
activities that affect requirements. Some overlap exists. However, the engineering 
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changes described here develop from engineering design analysis. This is a situation 
where the requirements lead to design complexity, problems, or compliance failure. 
Although technical analysis provides the basis for developing requirements, detail design 
engineering may provide greater accuracy. 
The engineering sourced changes are the manifestation of design risk inherent in 
the ship specification development. There is a limit to the level and detail of analysis 
during the pre-CDR period. The complexity of ship design programs creates enormous 
opportunity for subsequent engineering changes. 
In addition, there is a significant layer of changes, below the requirements level 
and within the detail design activity. They consist of changes to approved detail design 
products such as drawings and procurement specifications that do not require changes to 
the ship specification. 
Procuring valves is an example where the specifications may permit various body 
materials, and the shipbuilder selects bronze. Later, it is determined composite bodies are 
preferred, so the procurement specification is changed. Such a change may require other 
modifications, to the detail design, to support the new material, and potentially to the ship 
specification. 
Deficiencies in Government Furnished Information (GFI) or Contract Documents 
may also lead to design changes. Questions about GFI frequently result in the 
implementation of a newer version. The updated GFI usually includes some type of part 
number change at a minimum. Old parts are obsolete, or the vendor recently updated the 
system to a new and improved model, but provided the old information on the outdated 
system to meet contractual obligations. Any revision to pertinent design information 
discovered after contract award affects the shipbuilder’s activities and is subject to a cost 
adjustment. 
Engineering changes originate from both the Navy and the shipbuilder, the same 
as for requirements. By definition, the engineering changes occur post-CDR. As with 
requirements, engineering change has increasing potential for rework effects depending 
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on timing. Certainly, there is engineering and program management rework to effect the 
change along with the possibility of construction rework and sequencing issues. 
4. Construction 
Changes originating during the construction phase may come from planning or 
front line production. They include design improvements for performance or 
producibility, as well as identification of errors. At first glance, construction changes 
appear to have the greatest risk to rework since construction is in progress. In the case of 
design errors, this is true, but producibility changes generally are beneficial. 
Error detection during construction is potentially the most complex rework 
situation. Depending on severity, the change could affect requirements, engineering, and 
planning/construction. The worst case is where the change requires all of the above and 
includes the need to rework completed work packages and re-sequence construction. The 
change may come from original requirements, detail design, manufacturing 
interpretation, or it may come from a production error.  
Again, as for requirements, the Navy or the shipbuilder identifies the error or 
opportunity. Realistically, the expected changes from construction are due to design 




Pre-CDR changes are a component of the design development process. CDR 
entrance criteria require the design be ready to enter the detail design phase. The 
volatility, maturity, or readiness of the design is subject to interpretation. The Program 
Manager (PM) reports the readiness using appropriate measures and metrics to make the 
case for proceeding to detail design. There is obvious pressure to succeed, so there should 
be no surprise if changes are required immediately following CDR.  
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The real cost of pre-CDR change is elusive. Changes implemented before CDR 
are part of the design development contract. As mentioned earlier, the cost is not directly 
associated to the changes, but rather to the rate of changes as the program approaches 
CDR. Higher change rates indicate lower maturity and greater probability of post-CDR 
changes, which increase cost. In addition, lower maturity indicates a lower probability of 
fully concurrent design analysis, another reason to expect downstream changes with their 
additional cost. 
Post-CDR changes receive varying degrees of processing based on the estimated 
cost. Formal changes process through an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). ECPs 
themselves consume cost for research and analysis, as well as processing. They are 
funded typically through change management sections of detail design and construction 
contracts. These costs are more easily accounted for assuming they accurately reflect the 
impact of the ECP’s programmatic cost. 
Cost associated with design changes early in the shipbuilding process is generally 
limited to the change itself. However, when a change happens late in the program, a 
higher cost is incurred. This is because when the change occurs late in the program, in 
addition to the cost of the design change itself, there is an associated cost with 
rescheduling, re-planning, and re-scoping the amount of work and necessary resources 
required for the task. There is additional cost incurred due to an increase in the number of 
labor hours required to complete the change, as well as, any rework necessary on tasks 
already completed. If the change requires extending the schedule, additional cost growth 
could include increases in cost of overhead, inventory, material, labor, and associated 
inflation effects. 
In addition to the cost of rework directly related to the design change, changes to 
any one system or component may potentially lead to changes in other systems resulting 
in the need for additional changes and subsequently additional rework. This is true in all 
phases of the shipbuilding process. 
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2. Schedule 
Change affects schedule by creating additional work and, usually, rework. The 
magnitude of the schedule effect depends on the timing and complexity of the change. 
Changes can be absorbed into the design and production schedule as cost only. In most 
cases, the intricacy of the overall schedule allows disturbances that do not affect major 
milestones. However, it is important to understand that sequentially applied changes 
create convoluted schedule adjustments that have a greater effect together than 
separately. The aggregate effect may rise to a level where significant milestones slip. 
A significant effect of design change is out of sequence work. When ship 
production occurs according to schedule, the production group builds the ship during the 
Execution phase of the Management Cycle. The test group starts testing in a stand-alone 
environment during this phase. If production progresses as scheduled, installation of 
equipment and systems is complete and ready for test during the Evaluation phase. The 
fact that the production group’s work orders (bills) are zone oriented has no impact on 
test. 
Adding in the design changes leaves the production group installing equipment 
and systems later during the Evaluation phase. The production group and the test group 
suddenly have competing goals. The production supervisor still has the responsibility of 
building the ship and production work orders continue to be zone oriented. However, the 
test supervisor needs to complete tests, and the tests are systems oriented. This is a 
shipbuilding paradox. 
Since production work orders are zone oriented, the planning process usually 
allocates system installation across multiple work orders. If the production supervisor 
focuses on completing work orders, without concern for completing systems, the test 
supervisor cannot complete his goals. To support the test supervisor, the production 
group would have to work one or two items, on multiple work orders, to complete the 
installation of a system. The production supervisor may not consider this the most 
efficient method, and thus, there is a competition for resources.  
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In addition, it should be noted that a change in schedule has an impact on 
available resources to accomplish rework because of design change. The manufacturing 
process is carefully planned to ensure that the necessary skilled labor, equipment, and 
facility lay down spaces are available, when required, to support all programs under 
construction. As such, any change that results in schedule delays poses risk to other 
programs’ schedules due to competition for resources. This typically results in excessive 
overtime, and rental or procurement of additional equipment.  
Program schedules are politically sensitive territory. Rescheduling acquisition 
milestones is nearly impossible, and when required, is subject to rationalization. The 
aggregate effect of changes may not be recognizable in the cost accounting world of the 
program office. This does not reduce the criticality of change induced schedule effects. 
The most attractive solution for program managers is to convert the schedule impacts, 
due to change, into a cost. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The opportunity for change, over the multi-year period of design development, 
detail design, and construction of naval ships is significant. Personnel changes, 
interpretations, technology, mission, regulatory, producibility, etc., all contribute to 
ongoing changes from Milestone A through delivery. The sources of change are an 
important input to analysis of change consequences and potential mitigation. Their 
impact is derived from accounting and budgeting submissions, and reports, as well as 
reference analysis. 
Understanding the depth and breadth of design change implications is crucial to 
finding the real cost of rework. During any program phase, the consideration of a change 
initiates the cascade of inter-dependent effects that comprise the total cost of rework. The 
change proposal initiation kicks-off the change administration and change analysis. 




Estimating in and of itself is a complicated task. Several factors make an accurate 
estimate nearly impossible. Add in the fact that production continues while the shipyard 
scopes the change and negotiates with the customer. The impact to concurrent functional 
and/or detail design continues to grow during change adjudication, requiring rework to 
implement. Planning and sequencing continue and then require rework to implement. 
Construction continues, requiring direct rework as well as related construction activities 
due to re-sequencing. Perturbation due to the change ripples throughout the program, 
greatly reducing efficiencies. It is questionable whether the change analysis and 
adjudication process is capable of comprehending the full extent and impact of changes 
to schedules and costs.  
 
 61
V. DESIGN CHANGE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A variety of analytical approaches was utilized to examine design change rework. 
They consist of cost, case, and chronological analyses. The cost analyses reveal how the 
programs are managed and reported. The case analyses investigates technology, effects 
on the ground, and management. The chronological analyses examine program phase 
budgets and design maturity. The intent of this approach is to understand the impact and 
relationship of design change rework at the acquisition level. 
The actual cost of rework is proprietary to the contracted shipyard, and 
competition sensitive within the Navy. The cost analysis was derived from public 
acquisition level reports, data, and releases. The analysis attributes are inferred from the 
reference material and are not exact accounting figures; rather they are an informed 
estimate. 
The analysis approach is expressly disengaged from formal cost accounting for 
several reasons. Actual accounting data is proprietary and this thesis is not. Cost 
accounting activities are complex and may not provide an accurate design change cost 
picture. Such inaccuracies are substantial enough to influence budget level numbers, as in 
the case of CVN 76 (GAO, 2005b). The combination of shipbuilding and accounting 
complexities’ effects are not useful to this analysis. 
Budget information was analyzed based on GAO reports related to shipbuilding 
programs. Related budget information from Selected Acquisition Summary Reports 
(SASR) was analyzed as a comparison. In addition, the allocations were evaluated for 
variability over time, in SASRs, Program Cost Breakdowns (Exhibit P-5), and Budget 
Item Justification Sheets (P-40). SARS are prepared annually and provide the current 
estimate of programs’ cost, schedule, and technical status. Exhibit P-5, an annual budget 
submission, breaks down the program’s budget over purpose and time. Exhibit P-40 
provides individual program cost breakdowns.  
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Under the case approach, Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) were examined, 
for comparison, as a contributor to design change rework. A simulated scenario describes 
design change effects in the shipbuilding environment in order to enhance 
comprehension. Acquisition management and execution are examined for contributions 
and effects on the design change activity. The case analyses provide insight and 
comprehension of the design change rework issue. 
Lastly, a time based program budget analysis displays how budgets related to 
engineering changes are modified through the various acquisition phases. In addition, 
design maturity is examined with regard to some extreme cases. Design maturity must be 
examined from a chronological perspective since its effects are related to the maturity at 
CDR. That is, maturity as detail design and construction begins. It is at this point that 
design maturity creates the most profound effects. 
All of the analyses are intended to reveal the extent and magnitude of the design 
change rework problem, how well it is captured at the budgetary level, and significant 
contributors or indicators. 
B. COST ANALYSIS 
1. GAO Based Budget Level Data 
A rough order of magnitude (ROM) approach to the cost analysis was selected to 
quantify the cost of design change at the ship’s program budget level. The analysis 
includes inferred parameters for the base design change cost percentage rate (CBO, 
2003), (Moosally, 2007), (Teel, 2007). The base rate is modified depending on lead ship 
status. The selected ship budget data is then evaluated individually, as class subtotals, and 
grand totals.  
Shipbuilding programs contain an allocation for change orders. The change 
allocation varies by program from a low of 3% on current DDG 51s, to a high of 7% on 




higher allocation, but the program allocations are inconsistent with lead ships varying 
from 3% to 7% as well (GAO, 2005b). The allocated change order budget is expected to 
be low, with real expectations of from 10% to 15%. 
The sources used for the budget analysis baseline are GAO reports oriented to 
understanding the causes and potential solutions to Navy shipbuilding programs’ cost 
growth (GAO, 2005b) (GAO, 2007). Table 6 displays the budget data, baseline budget 
and budget growth due to construction, for a selected subset of ships (GAO, 2007). It 
includes an estimate of design change cost as a percentage of total budget aligned with 
the Allocated Change Cost budget.  
 
Ship  Baseline Construction Construction Estimated  Estimated Allocated Allocated
  Budget Growth % Growth Change Change Change Change 
     Cost % Cost % Cost Cost 
       
DDG 91  $917 $37 4% $95 10% 3% $28
DDG 92  $925 $62 7% $99 11% 3% $28
CVN 76  $4,476 $252 6% $473 11% 5% $224
CVN 77 L $4,975 -$51 -1% $788 16% 5% $249
LPD 17 L $954 $784 82% $278 29% 7% $67
LPD 18  $762 $246 32% $101 13% 4% $30
SSN 774 L $3,260 $327 10% $574 18% 3% $98
SSN 775 L $2,192 $294 13% $398 18% 4% $88
Subtotal  $18,461 $1,951 11% $2,805 15% 4% $811
Table 6.  Selected Change Cost Analysis ($Millions) 
 
Removing CVN 77, with negative construction growth due to shifting of cost to 
another program, and LPD 17, with extreme growth, from the analysis in Table 7, does 
not materially affect the relationship of the Estimated Change % Cost to Allocated. The 
ratio is approximately 3.6 to 1. The analysis demonstrates the difference between 
formally Allocated Change % Cost and the Estimated Change % Cost and their 





Ship  Baseline Construction Construction Estimated  Estimated Allocated Allocated
  Budget Growth % Growth Change Change Change Change 
     Cost % Cost % Cost Cost 
       
DDG 91  $917 $37 4% $95 10% 3% $28
DDG 92  $925 $62 7% $99 11% 3% $28
CVN 76  $4,476 $252 6% $473 11% 5% $224
LPD 18  $762 $246 32% $101 13% 4% $30
SSN 774 L $3,260 $327 10% $574 18% 3% $98
SSN 775 L $2,192 $294 13% $398 18% 4% $88
Subtotal  $12,532 $1,218 10% $1,739 14% 4% $495
Table 7.  Revised Change Cost Analysis ($Millions) 
 
Although Construction Growth appears to consist of the difference between the 
Estimated and Allocated Change Costs, an analysis of a larger sample of ships, Table 8, 
indicates otherwise. In Table 8, an analysis of thirty-five ships, the Construction Growth 
is approximately equal to the Estimated Change Cost. Using the average Allocated 
Change of 4% indicates the ships’ Budget Growth average of 11% significantly consists 
of design change cost.  
The ROM analysis is consistent with expert opinion (CBO, 2003), (Teel, 2007). 
Lead ships experience approximately 15% real change cost and follow-on ships 
experience approximately 10%. The average Estimated Change % Cost is 12%. It is three 
times greater than the average Allocated Change % Cost of 4%. Why would the estimate 
be different? The true cost of design change is elusive and the allocated budget is targeted 
to the cost accounting representation of the individual changes, Engineering Change 
Proposals (ECP). 
 
Ship  Baseline Construction Construction Estimated  Estimated 
  Budget Growth % Growth Change Change 
    Cost % Cost 
     
CVN 77 L $4,975 $771 15% $919 18%
CVN Subtotal  $4,975 $771 15% $919 18%
     
DDG 100  $938 $142 15% $108 12%
DDG 101  $935 $62 7% $100 11%
DDG 102  $1,016 $126 12% $114 11%
DDG 103  $1,107 $56 5% $116 11%
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Ship  Baseline Construction Construction Estimated  Estimated 
  Budget Growth % Growth Change Change 
    Cost % Cost 
DDG 104  $1,062 $97 9% $116 11%
DDG 105  $1,184 $42 4% $123 10%
DDG 106  $1,233 $27 2% $126 10%
DDG 107  $1,089 $21 2% $111 10%
DDG 108  $1,102 $18 2% $112 10%
DDG 109  $1,138 $21 2% $116 10%
DDG 110-112  $3,505 $29 1% $353 10%
DDG Subtotal  $14,309 $641 4% $1,495 10%
     
LCS 1-2 L $472 $603 128% $172 36%
LCS Subtotal  $472 $603 128% $172 36%
     
LHD 8  $1,893 $320 17% $221 12%
LHD Subtotal  $1,893 $320 17% $221 12%
     
LPD 18  $762 $531 70% $129 17%
LPD 19  $1,064 $228 21% $129 12%
LPD 20  $890 $311 35% $120 13%
LPD 21  $1,113 $283 25% $140 13%
LPD 22  $1,256 $287 23% $154 12%
LPD 23  $1,108 $337 30% $145 13%
LPD Subtotal  $6,193 $1,977 32% $817 13%
     
SSN 775  $2,192 $546 25% $274 12%
SSN 776  $2,020 $154 8% $217 11%
SSN 777  $2,276 $65 3% $234 10%
SSN 778  $2,192 $246 11% $244 11%
SSN 779  $2,152 $283 13% $244 11%
SSN 780  $2,245 $41 2% $229 10%
SSN 781  $2,402 -$24 -1% $238 10%
SSN 782  $2,612 -$7 0% $261 10%
SSN Subtotal  $18,091 $1,304 7% $1,940 11%
     
T-AKE 1 L $489 $44 9% $85 17%
T-AKE 2  $358 $9 3% $37 10%
T-AKE 3  $361 -$25 -7% $34 9%
T-AKE 4  $370 -$32 -9% $34 9%
T-AKE 5/6  $683 $20 3% $70 10%
T-AKE 7/8  $713 $4 1% $72 10%
T-AKE 9  $380 $9 2% $39 10%
T-AKE Subtotal  $3,354 $29 1% $370 11%
     
Grand Total  49,287 5,645 11% 5,934 12%
Table 8.  Change Cost Analysis ($Millions) 
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Another way to look at the data is to accept the estimate that 50% of program cost 
growth, 11%, is due to design change rework (CBO, 2003), (Teel, 2007). That is 5.5%, 
which added to the average allocation of 4% equals 9.5%. Again, this is consistent with 
the expert opinion, which suggests an average of 12%.  
The cost growth budget data indicates the design change cost is greater than the 
program allocations. Expert opinion and ROM analysis support each other and suggest 
the real cost of design change is three times the actual budget. 
2. SARS Based Budget Level Data 
A second approach to analyzing the design change cost uses Selected Acquisition 
Report Summaries (SARS) data from 1991 to present (DoD, 2007). Table 9 displays the 
budget data, baseline budget and program budget growth, for all available shipbuilding 
programs. Instead of an estimate of design change, the actual SARS Engineering Change 
Cost is presented. The Engineering Change % Cost is then calculated as a percentage of 
the baseline. 
 
Program Milestone  Baseline  Program   Program   Engineering   Engineering  
   Budget   Growth   % Growth   Change   Change  
      Cost   % Cost  
       
CG 47 B $9,014 $14,263 158% $981 11%
CVN 21 A $3,160 $18 1% $266 8%
CVN 21 B $27,986 $7,043 25% -$864 -3%
CVN 68 C $8,468 -$2,228 -26% -$66 -1%
CVN 72/73 C $5,266 $891 17% $0 0%
CVN 74/75 C $5,911 $1,111 19% $0 0%
CVN 76 C $3,984 $607 15% $36 1%
CVN 77 C $4,557 $743 16% -$66 -1%
DDG 1000 A  $1,754 $6,307 360% $3,283 187%
DDG 1000 C $25,217 $11,354 45% $3,706 15%
DDG 1000 A  $31,548 $4,474 14% -$841 -3%
DDG 51 C $16,954 $45,799 270% $2,251 13%
LCS A $1,173 $766 65% $73 6%
LHD 1 B $2,932 $7,069 241% $95 3%
LPD 17 A $61 $13 21% $4 6%
LPD 17 B $9,018 $6,594 73% $4,809 53%
SSGN C $3,869 $226 6% $7 0%
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Program Milestone  Baseline  Program   Program   Engineering   Engineering  
   Budget   Growth   % Growth   Change   Change  
      Cost   % Cost  
SSN 21 C $20,120 -$6,711 -33% $161 1%
SSN 21 B $20,120 -$6,963 -35% $0 0%
SSN 688 B $5,127 $22,964 448% $1,920 37%
SSN 688 C $5,127 $22,936 447% $0 0%
SSN 774 B $45,633 $47,375 104% $1,272 3%
Total  $256,996 $184,651 72% $17,026 7%
Table 9.  SARS Based Cost Analysis ($Millions) 
 
 The average Engineering Change % Cost is 7%. This is almost twice the average 
of 4% reported on selected programs in GAO-05-183. The difference is likely due to the 
4% average based on individual ship data where the SARS analysis is program based. As 
well, the 4% is a directed average, not a reported budget average, as is the case with the 
SARS. Therefore, the SARS Engineering Change % is a better indicator of the actual 
budget than the GAO reported budget assignment. 
3. GAO to SAR Comparison 
 The macro level proposed estimate of design change cost as a percentage of the 
baseline is difficult to verify with publicly available data. The SARS analysis indicates 
that budgeting activities approach an ongoing 7% average. The GAO reports an average 
planned change budget of 4%. Since the baseline budgets routinely overrun by an average 
construction growth of 11%, there is evidence the real cost of design change and rework 
is under budgeted and under reported. This is not an indictment or accusation of 
wrongdoing, but rather a question on whether current practices accurately reveal the cost 
of design change. The subject matter experts’ estimates of 15% for the lead ship, and 
10% for follow-on ships, are reasonable when compared to the budget data. 
 The DDG 51 program is a good source for examining design change cost in 
concert with the budget data. The lead ship of the class had a total change cost 16% of the 
baseline budget. (CBO, 2003) The ongoing average change cost for the follow-on ships is 
4%. Close examination reveals that several ships experienced significant negative change 
costs due to reduced Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) costs (GAO, 2007). The 
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savings in change costs resulted from selecting a less expensive combat system. 
Therefore, the ongoing budget change averages are skewed lower. The budget 
experiences the benefits of benign changes leading to lower average change cost. This 
example illustrates the under reporting of budget change costs. The lower cost GFE, 
while a design change by definition, align more to a baseline adjustment that should be 
captured outside of the change budget. 
 Ultimately, the most important data point is the magnitude of design change cost 
to the baseline budget. The analyses results of 10% to 15% are a significant portion of the 
total program cost, and deserve scrutiny for improving future performance. 
C. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Technology Readiness Level 
 Figure 18 presents an analysis of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) based 
on data from Table 5, as an indicator of budget growth due to ongoing design change 
cost. This analysis of multiple DoD programs is exclusive of shipbuilding. The solid line 
depicts a linear trend analysis of the data points. An inverse relationship exists between 
the TRL and the budget development cost growth. This relationship is expected, as lower 
TRL would indicate an ongoing need to perform design change as the technology 
matures. 
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Figure 18.  TRL to Cost Growth Analysis 
 
 The cost growth due to very low TRL averages 20% higher than the 100% TRL. 
Since the additional cost is primarily development, or design change, the 20% value 
roughly supports the 10% to 15% estimate used in the budget level analysis. The TRL 
analysis relates to the requirements maturity/volatility issue but is based on technology as 
a contributor rather than overall design maturity. 
2. Simulated Scenario 
Preliminary planning determines dates for key events at the time of bidding, prior 
to contract award. Key dates include keel laying, launching, and delivery. These dates are 
critical. The use of major resources, such as a dry dock, must be carefully coordinated 
when a shipyard is building multiple ships at a time. Although the schedule usually 
contains a little slack time, delays may force a ship to miss a particular window of 
opportunity, resulting in a domino effect across the yard. 
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 For example, a government furnished system, still under development after 
contract award, may have a major impact to cost and schedule if equipment for that 
system is located in a compartment in the lower sections of the ship. Lower 
compartments must be completed in a manner suitable to accommodate compartment 
testing prior to float-off. In order to prevent rework, the major equipment in these 
compartments has to be installed by this time. 
Depending on requirements, such as water-tightness and structural integrity, 
different types of compartment testing are conducted. A hull tightness test puts the 
compartment under air pressure in order to examine all fillet welded boundary 
connections and erection joints for leak detection. Any temporary access used for 
installing large equipment must be sealed prior to test. 
In order to prevent rework, the documentation, as well as the equipment, must be 
available to support the design, planning, purchasing and construction activities related to 
this sequencing of events. Late product definition or lack of technical information has an 
ever-increasing impact depending on the system’s equipment locations, as well as its 
interfaces. Detail design drawings affecting these lower compartments are required early 
in the schedule to support these activities. 
For example, a system cable block diagram may kick-off the process, identifying 
the need for the system to other disciplines, and to facilitate purchasing the associated 
equipment, cables, etc. An arrangement drawing is required to specify the location of the 
system’s equipment. Foundation drawings are required to define the structures fitted to 
support and secure the equipment to the main hull structure in a manner that resists 
deflections that could damage the device (SNAME, 1980). All of these require 
information in a timeframe that allows completion of the drawing by a certain date. 
The same government system may have equipment in other compartments or 
interface to other systems on the ship. These systems’ cable block diagrams, arrangement 
drawings, etc., are also dependent on information for the example government provided 
system. Therefore, lack of information affects multiple drawings, as well as the 
construction activities occurring in multiple areas of the ship. 
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The bid package, and consequently the contract, specifies the timeframe for the 
delivery of government furnished equipment and drawings required to support these 
design and construction efforts. The shipyard bases their estimates on these dates. If the 
delivery dates do not facilitate conducting detail design, procuring any required material, 
and completing the construction activities prior to the date required for compartment 
completion, the result is likely out-of-sequence-work and rework. 
With the delivery date as the driving factor for the ships schedule, drawings are 
scheduled to support construction of assemblies in a particular order. When a drawing is 
due for release, lack of information becomes an issue. The deficiency may only affect 
part of a drawing, with other parts being known. In order to complete as much of the 
design and construction activities as possible, drawing development proceeds, 
documenting missing information with reservations. This allows the use of known 
information, preventing an even greater disruption. 
Some effects of the missing information are evident already. Even if the customer 
provides the information shortly after release of the drawing, at a minimum, the drawing 
will require rework to remove the reservations and add the missing information. This 
requires additional work effort from all parties involved in the release of this drawing. 
Affected areas include various design engineering groups, technical checkers, 
configuration management, document control, planning, and any other discipline linked 
to this drawing. The later the information is available, the greater the impact. 
Failure to provide the information and/or equipment prior to construction of this 
lower compartment leads to completing the compartment and compartment testing 
without the equipment or possibly delaying this compartment’s completion. Completing 
the compartment and installing the equipment later requires reinstallation of a temporary 
access. Besides the additional work of cutting an access hole, then resealing the hole after 
equipment installation, this voids any completed testing of the compartment. The 
compartment must be retested and this increases labor costs as well as schedule slippage. 
Due to the timing, the additional work scope has grown. 
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Waiting for the equipment could delay float-off. Depending on dry dock 
availability, delaying float-off could have a major impact on the shipyard’s other projects. 
The other ships’ may also have a specified timeframe scheduled for use of the dry dock. 
Missing any ship’s window of opportunity may have serious consequences to the 
shipyard. Depending on the delay, the shipyard may chose to slip the timeframe for all of 
the ships, but more likely would reschedule this ship at a later available timeframe. 
It is not easy to determine the potential impact of a delay. Several immeasurable 
advantages of having the ship in the water are lost. For example, accessing the ship after 
it is in the water is usually much easier than accessing it on land or dry dock due to the 
number of stairs required for the higher elevation on land. Some support services, such as 
power or telephones, may not be available while on dry dock. 
The same situation, late product definition, could be the result of design changes 
or simply deficiencies in the information provided. If the contract specified a certain 
system, and changes to that system occurred after contract award, the result could 
potentially be rework. Again, depending on the timing of the change, the impacts 
increasingly cascade throughout the shipbuilding process. 
Even minor design change is disruptive. Dealing with numerous changes adds a 
whole new level of complexity. So much so that Volume 4, Chapter 6, of the Contract 
Pricing Reference Guides contains a section specifically addressing cumulative impact 
costs. The complexity of the inter-dependencies in shipbuilding makes it almost 
impossible to determine the cumulative effect of modifications. As defined by the guide: 
Cumulative-impact costs are costs that are unforeseeable or costs that were 
not readily computable at the time of an initial equitable adjustment. They 
typically occur as the result of an unanticipated loss of efficiency or 
productivity caused by numerous contract modifications on a single major 
contract. (Office of the Deputy Director of Defense Procurement for Cost, 
Pricing, and Finance [DP/CPF], 2000). 
The guide’s explanation of when the unforeseeable effect of numerous 
modifications warrant an equitable adjustment compares two case studies for reference. 
The Ingalls Shipbuilding case involved three shipbuilding contracts affected by several 
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thousand change orders, resulting in a 58 % contract price increase and a 4-year delay. 
The contract price increased from $113 to $209 million. The cumulative-impact costs 
from the Ingalls case were allowed (DP/CPF, 2000). 
In comparison, the Dyson case involved 39 change orders, resulting in a 19% 
increase and an additional 100 days. The contract price increased from $612,454 to $3.3 
million. The cumulative-impact costs from the Dyson case were not allowed (DP/CPF, 
2000). The two cases are widely cited, and debated, with the goal of clearly defining 
cumulative impact. Unfortunately, determining if the impacts caused by multiple changes 
were unforeseeable will always be subjective to some degree. 
Essentially, it comes down to pay for the services provided. If the contractor has 
started working on the job specified, after contract award, he expects to be paid for his 
services. If the customer changes the requirements of the job, via contract modification, 
making any or all of the incurred work obsolete, it does not absolve the customer from 
paying for services rendered. Unfortunately, the biggest challenge is accurately 
estimating the true impacts of the modifications. 
3. Acquisition Handling 
On July 24, 2007, in testimony before the Sub committee on Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Paul L. 
Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team stated that 
…what we really need is a new paradigm for establishing programs and 
overseeing them, and I’d say that would consists of three things. One is a 
better business case. A real solid business case up front for programs. A 
good plan for making business arrangements and contracting on programs 
and a good plan for execution. And I think to curb the optimism of what 
we see in programs today, we really do need that solid business case up 
front which I would describe as from requirements, mature technologies, a 
knowledge based lay down of all the key events in design and 
construction. Coupled with metrics for goodness. It’s one thing to lay the 
events down. It’s another to have a set of metrics or criteria to know 
whether they make sense or not. 
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As reported in GAO report 07-943T, Navy shipbuilding programs are often 
structured around a business case that is not executable due to the desire to introduce 
immature technologies, late design stability, and unrealistic cost and schedule estimates. 
Case in point are the LCS and LPD 17 programs. These programs trace back to a flawed 
business case (GAO, 2007). Despite “significant challenges” in the design, the Navy 
proceeded with unrealistic schedules that resulted in continuous out of sequence work. 
This drove considerable rework, disrupted the optimal construction sequence, and 
affected the application of lessons learned for follow on ships in the program (GAO 
2007). The GAO reports that both the DDG 1000 and CVN 78 programs are at risk for 
similar reasons.  
Coupled with inadequate or often no business case at the start of a program, the 
Department of Defense Program Managers are not given the necessary authority to 
successful execute acquisition programs. Studies performed by the GAO show that 
program managers cannot reject new requirements, control funding, or control staff. In 
surveys and subsequent interviews by the GAO, Program Managers attributed unstable 
requirements and funding, along with insufficient support from the DoD once a program 
begins, as their biggest obstacles in successful program execution (GAO, 2006b) 
Between April 2004 and November 2005, the GAO conducted a case study that 
compares the DoD’s product development with commercial product development efforts. 
What they discovered was that the commercial industry took a holistic approach and  
• Followed a rigorous process for short and long term strategic planning 
• Followed an evolutionary development process that focused on market 
needs and not attempt to meet all needs at once 
• Mapped product concepts requirements to resources to enable successful 
execution of a program within cost and schedule 
• Matched the right people to the program 
• Adhered to knowledge driven development decisions 
• Empowered program managers to make decisions regarding program 
readiness, problem resolutions and implementation solutions 
• Senior leaders set clear goals for the Project Manager and team with 
incentives for meeting those goals and Program Managers were held 
accountable for decisions made 
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• Senior leadership committed to the programs under development and 
encouraged communication and collaboration 
Programs from commercial industries contributed their success to the support 
from their top leadership and to a disciplined approach to strategic investment, program 
selection, and execution driven by knowledge based processes. Figure 19 depicts the 
critical support and accountability factors that guide commercial product development. 
 
Figure 19.  Critical Support and Accountability Factors (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06110.pdf) 
 
Although senior DoD leaders attempt to develop short and long term strategic 
plans for US defense, this rarely happens. Unrealistic investment strategies do not ensure 
pursuit of the right program mix. In addition, DoD does not always ensure development 
of a realistic business case for new initiatives. Program managers are not fully 
empowered to manage programs once started, nor held accountable when programs falter 
(GAO, 2005a). DoD program managers, surveyed by the GAO, stated that users 
frequently requested new or improved capabilities as programs moved forward through 
the acquisition process. These additional requirements were usually not funded and the 
Program Managers felt they were not authorized to refuse the additions. 
Program managers also indicated their belief that program decisions were made 
“based on funding needs of other programs rather than demonstrable knowledge” (GAO, 
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2005a, p.37). Furthermore, they felt they lacked necessary resources to provide program 
cost, schedule, and performance information to their leadership. They felt they were not 
trusted, nor were  they encouraged to openly communicate and collaborate due to fear of 
funding adjustments, and they felt continued promotion of their programs was necessary 
to maintain commitment from top leadership (GAO, 2005a).  
Table 10 highlights key differences between the best practices employed by 
leadership in the commercial industries and the DoD’s way of conducting business. DoD 
Program Managers’ comments, collected in GAO surveys, as well as follow-up 
interviews, suggest that while the DoD is proficient at developing long-term visions and 
strategic plans, it does not develop “integrated investment strategies” for weapon 
acquisitions to achieve planning goals. Consequently, more programs than can be 
afforded are initiated. This leads to competition between programs for funding, thereby 
promoting cost estimates and program capabilities that are not achievable (GAO, 2005a). 
 
Table 10.  Strategic Leadership Support Comparison (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new items/ d06110.pdf) 
Although some effort has been made to adopt processes supporting evolutionary 
development, significant increase in capability is still expected. DoD policy now 
encourages programs to match requirements to resources prior to program initiation. 
Instability in funding and requirements are still the biggest risk factors to program 
success (GAO, 2005a). Figure 20 illustrates the breakdowns in support and accountability 
in the DoD. 
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Figure 20.  Breakdowns in Support and Accountability Factors (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06110.pdf) 
The GAO revealed a number of problems with the acquisition process. For 
example, the DoD’s acquisition policy encourages best practice for decision making such 
as technology demonstration, but does not establish any controls to ensure it is practiced. 
In some cases, programs can move into design, integration, and production phases prior 
to readiness demonstration. Without controls to ensure following the practice, the time 
and effort exerted to ensure utilization of a knowledge-based approach during decision-
making processes, is a wasted effort. Table 11 highlights the difference between 
commercial industry and the DoD with regard to knowledge based development and 
accountability. The GAO derived this information from interviews of Program Managers, 
past reports, and observations made during the 2004-2005 study. 
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Table 11.  Knowledge Base Comparison Support and Accountability Factors (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new items/d06110.pdf) 
The GAO has made recommendations in the past that DoD utilize analysis 
derived from preliminary design using system engineering tools. The knowledge capture 
should include completion status of engineering drawings, systems, subsystems, design 
reviews, stakeholder analysis of level of completion, and “identification of critical 
manufacturing processes.” However, the GAO reported that DoD acquisition programs 
continued to move forward and yet failed to demonstrate readiness to go. The GAO 
points out, in a recent analysis of major weapon systems, that only 42% had achieved 
design stability at design review and virtually none, either in production or nearing 
production, planned to ensure production reliability (GAO, 2005a). 
Figure 21 illustrates the differences in how the commercial industry defines 
success in product development and how the DoD defines success in program 
acquisition. In the commercial industry, the measure of success is simply to maximize 
profit. This is achieved by delivering a quality product to market, at the right time, and at 
the right cost, by using realistic investment strategies to achieve results. It is not so 
simple in the DoD. The DoD defines success as the ability to deliver high performance 
weapon systems to the Warfighter. This is contingent on the ability to attract funding 
successfully, for the desired programs during annual appropriations. Program managers 
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are compelled to be over optimistic about schedules, cost and technology readiness to 
maintain political support and funding of their programs (GAO, 2005a). 
 
Figure 21.  Key Differences in Definition of Success and Resulting Behaviors (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new items/d06110.pdf) 
Oversight in the DoD adds an additional layer of difficulty and pressure to the 
acquisition process. Figure 22 shows a more streamlined approach in commercial 
industries visited by the GAO, as opposed to the many layers, both internal and external, 
that DoD program managers contend with. With the time required to deliver complex 
weapon systems to the Warfighter, the organizational structure of the oversight process 
can go through several changes of command. This causes priorities to change throughout 
the life of a program. Program mangers repeatedly face challenges to obtain continued 
funding and support for programs under development. 
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Figure 22.  Commercial vs. DoD Oversight Environment (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new items/d06110.pdf) 
D. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Program Phase 
 The SARS analysis to determine engineering change cost in relation to the 
baseline is supportive of reported cost by program phase. The SARS reports indicate the 
program phase for each line of budget data. Sorting and subtotaling provides the 
engineering change cost budget by phase in Table 12. 
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Program Phase  Baseline   Program   Program   Engineering   Engineering  
   Budget   Growth   % Growth   Change   Change  
      Cost   % Cost  
       
CVN 21 A $3,160 $18 1% $266  8%
LCS A $1,173 $766 65% $73  6%
LPD 17 A $61 $13 21% $4  6%
DDG 1000 A $1,754 $6,307 360% $3,283  187%
DDG 1000 A $31,548 $4,474 14% ($841) -3%
A Subtotal  $37,696 $11,578 31% $2,785  7%
       
CG 47 B $9,014 $14,263 158% $981  11%
CVN 21 B $27,986 $7,043 25% ($864) -3%
LHD 1 B $2,932 $7,069 241% $95  3%
LPD 17 B $9,018 $6,594 73% $4,809  53%
SSN 21 B $20,120 ($6,963) -35% $0  0%
SSN 688 B $5,127 $22,964 448% $1,920  37%
SSN 774 B $45,633 $47,375 104% $1,272  3%
B Subtotal  $119,829 $98,345 82% $8,212  7%
       
CVN 68 C $8,468 ($2,228) -26% ($66) -1%
CVN 72/73 C $5,266 $891 17% $0  0%
CVN 74/75 C $5,911 $1,111 19% $0  0%
CVN 76 C $3,984 $607 15% $36  1%
CVN 77 C $4,557 $743 16% ($66) -1%
DDG 1000 C $25,217 $11,354 45% $3,706  15%
DDG 51 C $16,954 $45,799 270% $2,251  13%
SSGN C $3,869 $226 6% $7  0%
SSN 21 C $20,120 ($6,711) -33% $161  1%
SSN 688 C $5,127 $22,936 447% $0  0%
C Subtotal  $99,471 $74,728 75% $6,029  6%
      
Grand Total  $256,996 $184,651 72% $17,026  7%
Table 12.  SARS Change Cost by Phase ($Millions) 
 
Each of the three phases has the same basic average Engineering Change % Cost 
of approximately 7%. Phase C is 6% and one would expect it to have the most change 
cost, yet unexpectedly, it is lowest. The shipbuilder labor cost experience expected in 
Phase C is represented in Figure 23. It depicts the rising effect as design changes delay 
past the start of production. 
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Figure 23.  Shipbuilder Change Induced Labor over Time (From: Storch, 1995) 
 
The relatively constant Engineering Change % Cost may either indicate that 
original estimates are correct, or that the budget is controlled over the effects of design 
change. Since the previous analysis and research indicate the budget is under reported, 
the phase analysis demonstrates the Engineering Change % Cost is not an accurate 
representation of the actual budget cost. In general, it is under reported, and managed, to 
maintain a constant relationship to the baseline.  
An important point to note is most programs are re-baselined as they reach each 
milestone. The Engineering Change % Cost remains constant as a percentage of the 
current baseline, which is usually growing as the program passes through the milestones. 
2. Design Maturity 
There are two components of rework from the maturation of requirements. The 
first is the inherent, concurrent analysis used to resolve the effects of the change and gain 
approval from the appropriate change review board or authority. It occurs during the 
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change period, considered design development, and is not applicable to this study. The 
second is a post-CDR effect created by requirements volatility, or rate of change, that 
results in changes to resolve ambiguity or interpretations. The downstream changes 
essentially consist of design development cost indirectly deferred to the follow on period, 
post-CDR, due to lack of maturity and schedule pressure.   
However, the maturity of the design at CDR has a significant cost effect. 
Research on the effects of requirements volatility displays it as a leading indicator of 
significant post-CDR change activity and program overruns. Earlier discussion on the 
cost of pre-CDR change as inherent to the program is accurate. For some programs, the 
maturity is too low, and therefore volatility too high, to carry on past CDR without severe 
negative effects on cost and change activity (GAO, 2005b). At some point, the volatility 
extends past construction start, or conversely the start is premature, greatly compounding 
the effect. 
Requirements volatility exerts a disproportionate design change cost effect. There 
is no direct correlation between volatility measures and cost. The effect is identified by a 
short detail design period prior to construction start, or expert opinion on the technical 
maturity. Ships entering detail design or construction, with high requirements volatility, 
experience cost overruns in excess of the average by a factor of three or more. The 
percent of the baseline budget attributed to LCS 1-2 design changes is 36%, Table 8, and 
that of LPD 17 is 29%, Table 6. These estimates are much greater than the programs’ 
budgetary 4% and 7% respectively. The requirements volatility effects are extreme and 
are a significant contribution to design change rework. Of all the contributing issues to 
design change rework, requirements volatility/maturity is by far the most influential. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 The layering complexities of acquisition management, ship design and 
construction, design change and rework, on top of accounting practices and requirements, 




and rework on shipbuilding program costs without using proprietary or sensitive 
information requires a ROM approach. The analysis indicates the real cost of change is 
likely not conveyed by budgets or cost reporting.  
The budgeted range of change cost allocations is 3% to 7%. Examining the effects 
of design change, requirements maturity/volatility, and budget analysis suggests the real 
cost is about three times greater, from 10% to 16%. The supporting analysis includes 
GAO and SAR budget data, TRL to cost growth, simulation, and SAR by phase. The 
budget and growth based analysis depict the growth experienced by shipbuilding 
programs and the expected contribution of change. Experts attribute nearly 50% of cost 
growth to change activity (CBO, 2005), (Teel, 2007).All of the examined sources indicate 
the proposed estimates are reasonable.  
This is a significant level of cost and important to understand. The average cost of 
ships today is approximately $1.1 billion. 10% to 15% of that cost is $110 million to 
$165 million per ship. For a mature ship design, without significant changes, like the 
DDG 51 class, it is enough to pay for nearly half a new ship. When the DoD acquisition 
community searches for opportunities to lower costs, they generally look to performance, 
rather than drivers. One could argue a number of justifiable reasons for design change, 
but the cost must be recognized and accounted for. 
Research indicates a significant amount of the design change cost comes from 
requirements as well as DoD imposed regulations (CBO, 2005). Since this cost is actually 
incurred post-CDR, it demonstrates the design is not fully mature prior to detail design 
and construction. Design maturity, or requirements volatility, was shown separately as a 
potentially powerful driver of excessive cost growth due to design change rework. When 
examining program technical aspects for opportunities to save cost, the design maturity 
must be at the top of the list. The design maturity is a driver that no Program Manager or 
shipbuilder can overcome. Moreover, past a certain point, it has a disproportionate effect 
on design change rework cost and program cost growth, as in the case of LCS and LPD. 
Management of design change emerges as the most controllable component of 
cost. Like most business situations faced by modern companies, management is the key 
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to success. This is true also for DoD acquisitions. The shipbuilding acquisition and 
technical management, from the DoD down through the Program Management Office, 
the shipbuilder, and ultimately the frontline supervisor, all have a role to play in 
comprehending the full scope impact of design change rework. They must operate with a 
priority goal of minimizing, and controlling the initiation and conduct of design change. 
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Analyzing Naval Shipbuilding projects from Milestone A through system 
development, construction, and delivery, provides insight into the complexity of the time 
phasing and interdependencies of program and contractor activities. Adhering to the DoD 
Acquisition System process, by meeting the requirements for each milestone and decision 
point, should provide an effective, affordable solution, producible in a timely manner. 
This being the primary objective of Defense acquisition, one would not expect design 
change prior to the ship’s delivery. 
Unfortunately, many of today’s programs are plagued with design changes. Issues 
identified point to poor execution of the policies and procedures. Several examples of 
incomplete or ambiguous requirements indicate a failure to follow the process. Bypassing 
exit criteria and key decision points for each phase often occurs in the name of new 
technology. The success of each phase depends heavily on the quality of the decisions 
and deliverables from the previous phase. Sidestepping key decision points or allowing 
insufficient/ill-defined requirements has an increasingly negative effect on follow-on 
phase performance. 
These deficiencies often start a sequence of events that result in rework. The use 
of immature technology or incomplete/ambiguous requirements leads to an unstable 
design. Unstable design leads to design changes. Design changes lead to out-of-sequence 
work and uncontrolled manufacturing processes. The GAO illustrates quality problems 
and labor inefficiencies, due to lack of control, in Figure 24 (GAO, 2002). Programs with 
numerous changes indicate that at least portions of the design were unstable prior to 
contract award. 
The thesis research addresses deficiencies in execution of the acquisition process 
and finds them closely related to rework resulting from design change. Figure 24 
illustrates the notional impact to cost and schedule due to unstable design vs. stable 
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design. The impacts leading from the use of immature technology is in stark contrast to 
the controlled environment and stable design facilitated by the use of mature technology 
(GAO, 2002). 
  
Figure 24.  Notional Illustration Showing Stable vs. Unstable Design (From: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02701.pdf) 
Design changes are inevitable. They may be the result of efforts to provide an 
improved solution or the correction to an existing deficiency. Project managers frequently 
identify change as the major cause of program failure. This chapter reviews key points 
associated with design changes leading to rework and proposes modifications and 
improvements to existing shipbuilding and Navy practices. Balancing the objectives of 
the goal to provide to the Warfighter, battle space dominance, while keeping the overall 
cost low enough to allow consistent purchase of additional ships, requires a concerted 
effort by all parties. 
 89
B. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
Following the Systems Acquisition process provides a good start to executing a 
successful program. The requirements for each milestone and decision point must be 
satisfied and the deliverables for each phase complete and concise. Anything less starts a 
chain of events resulting in design change, one of the major causes of rework. 
1. Major Causes of Rework 
What are the major causes of rework? Rework is the act of redoing, correcting, or 
rebuilding. Design change is considered the largest contributor to rework, and often 
causes out-of-sequence work. Out-of-sequence work reduces efficiencies and may result 
in more rework. Based on the definition of rework, the thesis finds two different 
situations as major contributors to rework. 
The first consists of design changes, where a contract modification replaces a 
previously specified item or system with a different item or system. This usually occurs 
due to technology obsolescence or the introduction of an improved capability. The 
second situation consists of errors and omissions in the contract documents, 
specifications and/or supporting government furnished information. Resolving this lack 
of information usually requires additional work effort by the contractor and is therefore 
design change. 
In either case, changes invoking additional work effort by the contractor require a 
contract change and equitable adjustment. The equitable adjustment should address 
payment for work already accomplished by the time the change is authorized or a stop 
work is put in place. Unforeseen consequences often generate extra rework because of the 
changes. The interdependencies of the ship design and construction process almost 
guarantee additional rework when anything other than what is scheduled occurs. 
2. Reducing Requirements Volatility and Resulting Rework 
How can requirements volatility and associated rework be reduced? Requirements 
volatility is a potentially explosive contributor to design change rework. The 
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consequences of proceeding with an immature design at CDR are too great to overlook. 
The expectation of a high maturity level at CDR is critical to reduce the chances of 
extreme effects. The DoD 5000 process should include greater clarity and require a high 
level of approval in order to ensure a mature design and to prevent significant ongoing 
change. 
To prevent the excessive effects encountered by the LCS or LPD programs, the 
Program Manager and shipbuilder should strive to reduce requirements volatility, 
approaching CDR, as it translates to lower design change rates. In fact, requirements 
volatility should be eliminated in the run up to CDR. This can be accomplished by 
managing the design toward modularity and subsystem independence. Taking steps to 
promote a stable and robust design improves the likelihood of reduced changes, and 
provides greater accommodation of directed changes. 
The entire period following Milestone A is the best place to promote design 
stability. Pushing the high-level solution of functional requirements, early and with zeal, 
leads to less churn and a quicker design. The Program Manager has the ability to 
influence the direction of the technical solution toward stable, elegant, and simple design 
that matures before the need to evaluate at CDR. 
3. Reducing Design Changes after Start of Detail Design 
How can the quantity and cost of design changes after start of detail design and 
construction be reduced? The timing of the design change has an increasing direct effect 
on the potential impact to cost and schedule. Depending on the stage of the ship design 
and construction process, the resulting rework may be a simple change to a drawing or 
the drawing change followed by a complete rip-out and replacement of the equipment or 
system. Depending on the area of the ship impacted, the change may include a 
requirement to cut new access holes. In extreme cases, this could mean a return to dry 
dock. 
A closer investigation provides insight into the true causes of design change and 
potential areas for improvement. Design change is most evident when a previously 
specified item or system is revised to a different item or system through some type of 
 91
contract modification. The change could be customer or contractor driven. It may be 
motivated by the desire to incorporate an improved technology, or simply the correction 
of a design deficiency. As in the case of LCS 1, new rules and regulations may be 
imposed after contract award. 
Design change in one area may lead to the need for design change in another area. 
Several factors contribute to the potential impact resulting from the change. A few 
examples to consider are:  
• The timing and magnitude of the change (Impact to schedule?) 
• Whether the system is stand-alone or tightly integrated with other systems 
(Impact to other areas/systems?) 
• How much of the original work is already or will be completed by the time 
the change is negotiated and implemented (Rip-out, re-test?) 
• When will the change be implemented (Stop work or risk additional rip-
out, retest?) 
The contractor is compensated for any/all of the original work completed prior to 
a stop work order or the negotiation and authorization of the change. This adds an 
additional layer of complexity. In most cases, the status of in-process work is fairly 
subjective. The whole process of installing equipment only to rip it out later generates 
waste of time and money, not to mention negative consequences to quality and employee 
morale. 
The acquisition process should proceed with stable design only. This does not 
mean the project should be cancelled or delayed when the desired technology is not 
available. It means reducing the risk of rework by specifying only mature solutions in the 
contract. Reserve space and weight in all cases where design depends on immature 
technology. 
Additional design development will be required once the design is mature and the 
information is available. Reserving space and weight, as opposed to providing incorrect 
information for an unstable design, reduces any chance that the shipyard purchases 
erroneous material and installs it on the ship. This reduces some of the cascading effects 
of rework. It also lessens the impact to quality and craft morale. 
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4. High Cost of Out-of-Sequence Work 
How to provide the latest and greatest technology without incurring the high cost 
of out of sequence work? Consider the contracting of a house as a simple scenario used to 
explore rework and the high cost of out-of-sequence work. The owner requests the 
contractor build a house, providing specific requirements such as desired square footage, 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, type of exterior, etc. The house must be complete 
within six months of signing the contract. The contractor provides a proposal based on 
the owner’s specified requirements and floor plan or general arrangements. A contract is 
signed once the owner and contractor agree on a price.  
The contractor, now under contract, develops detailed plans based on the contract 
documents reflecting the owner’s requirements. The details include such items as what 
color to paint each room, type and color of flooring, etc. The owner may have specified a 
particular wall color, or in the absence of specification, the contractor may submit a 
request for information. 
The contractor schedules the construction activities in a particular order to 
facilitate efficient use of resources and to prevent interference or disruption that would 
jeopardize the required completion date. When the time comes to paint a particular room, 
the contractor schedules the painter. The painter preps the room for paint, taking 
precautions to prevent any undesired impact to other areas of the house. For efficiency 
sake, the contractor schedules the painter prior to installation of any fixtures or flooring. 
A few months after the painter completes the task, the owner decides the room 
should be a different color. By this time, the flooring is installed. Initially, this may seem 
like a minor change. If the original cost to paint the room is x, then it should cost x to 
paint it again. However, the situation has changed and is still changing. The schedule is 
tight and the completion date is fast approaching. The contractor is ready to schedule the 
installation of fixtures. 
The change procedure requires that the owner submit the change request for 
proposal by the contractor. The contractor receives the request. Determining the impact 
of the modification is no simple task. If the owner did not request a stop work, the 
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contractor has two choices. He can follow the schedule or delay work in the area 
impacted to prevent additional disruptions. The time it takes to scope and negotiate the 
change may render the risk of a delay infeasible. 
Without a stop work, the contractor will most likely follow the schedule and 
install the fixtures on the chance that the owner will not accept the bid and cancel the 
change. This removes any added risk on the contractor’s part of missing the deadline. 
Unfortunately, the cost of any change not yet authorized continues to grow as the original 
work is completed. In this case, the cost growth consists of the additional rework now 
required to remove and replace the fixtures prior to painting if the change is 
implemented. 
Other considerations for impact include the fact that flooring was installed and 
will require special protection. The current color is hard to cover and will require 
additional prep. Using the Reasonable Cost Approach, the contractor calculates the net 
cost of the contract modification as follows (Office of the Deputy Director of Defense 
Procurement for Cost, Pricing, and Finance [DP/CPF], 2000): 
N = A – D + C 
where:  
N = Net change in cost related to contract modification 
A = Current estimate of the cost to complete added work 
D = Current estimate of the cost to complete deleted work not yet 
performed 
C = Actual cost of all deleted work already performed. 
The current estimate of the cost to complete added work, A, is now 2x due to the 
additional prep work, removal and replacement of fixtures, and special protection of the 
flooring. The current estimate of the cost to complete deleted work not yet performed, D, 
is $0 because the task to paint the room to the original specified color has already been 
completed. The actual cost of all deleted work already performed, C, is x, the cost to 
paint the room the original specified color. The net change in cost related to contract 
modification, N, is: 
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N = 2x – 0 + x = 3x 
In the sample scenario, the contract modification is three times the cost of the 
original work due to the timing of the change and the resulting out-of-sequence work. If 
the owner changed the color prior to the initial paint, the cost would have been 
substantially lower. Often what seems like a minor change has a ripple effect leading to 
significant unforeseeable disruptions to both cost and schedule. 
Volume 4, Chapter 6, of the Contract Pricing Reference Guides provides an 
example of unforeseeable impacts resulting from just one modification (DP/CPF, 2000). 
In the Penner case, the government directed the contractor to change the method of pile 
driving under a construction contract due to potential damage to adjacent property. The 
contract modification required the contractor use water jetting instead of steam-activated 
pile driving. The contractor took reasonable steps to handle large amounts of water but 
was still overwhelmed by the actual amount of both water and mud. 
The disruptions resulted in out-of-sequence work and considerable delays to the 
project schedule. The guide cites the Government as the responsible party for the 
unanticipated issues, due to the directive requiring jetting as the method of work. Out-of-
sequence work should be avoided if possible. It inevitably leads to disruptions and 
rework which are both detrimental in terms of cost and schedule. 
All effort should be made to prevent design changes. If design changes are 
required, a stop work should be put in place immediately to prevent the cascading effect 
of rework, waste and out-of-sequence work. The shipbuilder’s processes should support 
potential growth by making efficient use of ship space. The production support system 
should provide the means to anticipate and manage out-of-sequence work.  
5. Concurrent Technology Development and Production 
Is it more cost effective to proceed with an unstable design or delay the start of 
design and construction? A primary cause of out-of-sequence work is the use of 
immature technology. The acquisition community accepts the additional risk with the 
intent of developing the technology while developing the product. Lack of information 
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usually accompanies lack of technology maturity. The deficiency of information or other 
resources required at a specific time may lead to out-of-sequence work and ultimately 
rework. 
In order to provide the latest and greatest technology, the acquisition community 
often bypasses rules or guidelines designed to prevent the use of immature technology 
(GAO, 2006b). They justify the additional risk as a worthy trade-off for the capability 
gained. Moving forward with immature technology introduces instability and risk into the 
program. 
Not only is the technology not available at the onset of the program, but the 
documentation required for detail design is often missing or incomplete. Drawings 
defining the equipment’s footprint or power requirements are usually required early in the 
program. This is especially true if the equipment is located in a lower assembly where 
early removal of access holes is required. 
As stated earlier, it is more cost effective to delay the start of the detail design and 
construction of unstable systems until the technology and supporting information are 
developed. Reserving space and weight informs the contractor that a change is 
forthcoming. The contractor can plan for the growth without having to act on bad 
information specified as a placeholder in the contract. 
6. Acquisition Process – Event Driven vs. Schedule Driven 
Is it more cost effective to use an event driven or schedule driven process? A 
disciplined acquisition process is essential to the success of any program. This must be a 
joint effort between the customer and the contractor, with investment strategies and 
business cases developed prior to program start. 
Inadequate and/or ambiguous requirements definitions, along with weak or non-
existent processes for evaluating requirements, signify a recipe for disaster. Realistic 
requirements must be established early with a rigorous process in place. Evaluation 
criteria should allow for the elimination of non-value added requirements and/or design 
changes that will place a program at undue risk. 
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Due to funding and the demand for Operational Capability, programs tend to lean 
toward a schedule driven process. Several studies show that event driven scheduling 
reduces risk to a program by ensuring that technology and process maturity are 
demonstrated prior to each follow on event. In a 2002 report on best practices, the GAO 
stated that “DoD’s acquisition policy establishes a good framework for developing 
weapon systems; however, more specific criteria, disciplined adherence and stronger 
acquisition incentives are needed to ensure the timely capture and use of knowledge and 
decision making” (GAO, 2002). The thesis research finds this to be true. 
The acquisition process consists of well-established policies and procedures. 
Problems occur when the process is not consistently followed. Fear of losing program 
funding due to early identification of issues is a primary factor in the failure to execute 
the programs consistently. Therefore, the focus is on meeting schedules as opposed to 
achieving events necessary to move effectively to the next step. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED/HEURISTICS 
The most significant lesson learned from the rework research is the potential for 
excessive design change due to requirements volatility. Proceeding to detail design and 
construction with an immature design poses an extreme risk. Oversight provides one 
method for preventing this problem. However, a more proactive approach involves 
looking at where and how the design originates. 
Heuristic: The beginning is the most important part of the work 
(Plato, 4th Century BC). 
The early work to develop the design is a leading indicator of design stability and 
maturity at CDR. The initial stages of concept development and system design set the 
stage for success and cost. This period is extremely sensitive to design choices as they 
shape further concept and design creation. If requirements specify building a house from 
rock, then further design becomes restricted to determining how to use the material. The 
goal, then, is to strive for design maturity and stability well before committing to detail 
design and construction. 
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Heuristic: The majority of the cost is determined in the early phases 
of the program (Systems Engineering Wisdom of the 1990s). 
1. Defense Acquisition Process – Inconsistent Execution 
The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.1 defines the Defense 
Acquisition System as “the management process by which the Department of Defense 
provides effective, affordable, and timely systems, to the users” (DoDD 5000.1, 2003). 
The directive contains various policies aimed at meeting this objective. These policies 
govern the Defense Acquisition System. 
The framework guiding the process consists of milestones and decision points 
with phase specific entrance and exit criteria. It allows Milestone Decision Authorities 
(MDA) and Program Managers some tailoring of program strategies and oversight in 
order to provide flexibility and promote innovation. The exit criterion for each phase 
seeks to prevent program risk by holding the program accountable for effectiveness, 
affordability and timeliness. 
Accountability of these three items is an iterative check throughout the acquisition 
process. The eventual success of the program depends on each. Failure to meet any of 
these constraints puts the program at risk and at a minimum, raises the risk of requiring 
design changes. With such a process in place, it was surprising to find program after 
program lacking in at least one of these areas. 
Heuristic: Discipline, Discipline, Discipline (Douglas R. King, 1991) 
(Maier & Rechtin, 2002). 
Specifying a system in the contract and then changing that system prior to 
delivery indicates some type of failure during the acquisition system process. If the 
system was effective, affordable and could be developed in a timely manner, why would 
it be ripped off a ship prior to ever being used? What makes an effective system at 
contract award suddenly become ineffective and how often does it happen? The answer 
seems to be that the selected solution did not adequately meet the acquisition system 
criteria. 
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Most changes drive up cost, so changes to resolve affordability issues after 
contract award are unlikely. Technology development concurrent with product 
development may encounter unforeseen set backs. Acceptable timeframes prior to 
contract award no longer supports the scheduled ship design and construction activities. 
An examination of major causes of rework points to the failure to meet any one of these 
criteria. 
Knowledge-Based Acquisition is listed as one of the additional policies in 
Enclosure 1 of DoDD 5000.1. It specifies that the PM will “reduce technology risk, 
demonstrate technologies in a relevant environment, and identify technology alternatives, 
prior to program initiation” (DoDD 5000.1, 2003). The PM is to provide knowledge 
about key system aspects at specific decision points in the process. Even though this 
policy relates directly to the technology readiness level of a product, it does not specify 
any measurable criteria. 
Heuristic: Define how an acceptance criterion is to be certified at the 
same time the criterion is established. 
The use of immature technology in the development of a program is a widespread 
issue. The uncertainty of developing the technology while developing the product 
violates the timeliness objective at a minimum and depending on the time of final 
implementation, most like the affordability objective too. Programs using immature 
technology usually incur changes in requirements and funding after the program begins. 
PMs credit changing requirements and unstable funding as their main impediment to 
success (GAO, 2006b). 
Recent changes in acquisition law require the DoD to certify that technology has 
been demonstrated to a specified minimum maturity level prior to use for system 
development (GAO, 2006b). This law represents a best practice that facilitates 
predictable program outcomes. Cost growth of programs using mature technology 
typically averages 5 %. In contrast, programs using immature technology experience 
around a 35 % cost growth (GAO, 2006b). 
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Proceeding with immature technology adds risk to both cost and schedule. The 
lack of information makes it hard, if not impossible, to develop a sound business case. 
This provides another example of bypassing the requirements of the acquisition system. 
Failure to execute consistently the acquisition policies and procedures is well 
documented. The follow on detail and construction activities fully depend on the quality 
of deliverables from this process. 
2. The Shipbuilding Design and Construction Process – Too Rigid for 
Design Changes 
The shipbuilder is in business to make a profit. Unscoped system or subsystem 
impacts, resulting from design changes, chip away at that profit. To prevent the 
possibility of uncompensated work, strict adherence to the contract and schedule is 
important. Capturing all impacts driven by customer specified design changes is equally 
important. This strict adherence sometimes leads to rework and waste.  Unfortunately, 
neither the shipyard nor the customer ever really knows the full impact of the changes. 
The primary bulk of design changes result from customer driven activities. An 
initial review of contract documents and GFI provides an opportunity for the contractor 
to question any obvious deficiencies. In several cases, the time required to discover a 
deficiency and authorization implementation does not support corrections prior to impact 
of detail design. 
Deficiencies are required to be documented in a formal process and submitted to 
the customer for resolution. The customer researches the problem and provides a 
response. If the response entails additional work by the contractor, a contract 
modification is required. All of this takes time. The contractor’s schedule contains 
minimal slack time. 
The customer prepares the contract modification and submits it to the contractor 
with a request for quote. The contractor scopes the change and provides a response to the 




activities so tightly scheduled, the contractor usually continues as planned, with the 
information provided. In other words, without a stop work order in place, the contractor 
develops the detail design drawings using the suspect data or GFI. 
Sometimes the customer specifies a system as rollover, or the same design from a 
previous ship. In reality, the customer knows there will be changes, but the technology is 
in development and the documentation for the new system is not available to support 
detail design. Informal discussions between the customer and the contractor hint about 
the new technology, but the contract specifies the legacy system. 
The schedule does not allow the contractor to gamble on the possibility of a 
contract modification for the new technology. The system may require long lead material 
or be tightly integrated to other systems on the ship. Out-of-sequence work may result in 
an additional cost. Without the customer directing the change or a stop work, the 
contractor would assume the risk of not meeting milestone dates. 
Unfortunately, the time it takes to process change often extends past the detail 
design phase and well into construction. This means ordering and possibly installing 
equipment, cables, etc. for this legacy system onboard ship. All of this occurs even 
though the customer and the contractor are in the process of modifying the contract for 
the new system. Why allow such waste? 
Both parties identify the risk of the change not being approved as justification to 
continue activities based on the original contract. Since the customer did not initiate a 
stop work, the contractor proceeds with the contractual direction provided. As the 
original work is completed, the cost of the increase grows in direct correlation with the 
time it takes to authorize implementation of the change. 
The situation of specifying an unstable design adds risk to the contract. The 
contractor did not specify the unstable design. The goal of the acquisition system should 
be to manage risk, not shift the risk to the contractor. Nevertheless, at the same time, the 
contractor should seek practices that allow some flexibility to accommodate waiting for 
improved technology within a reasonable timeframe.  
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In addition to schedule limitations, the actual implementation of the design seems 
inhibitive to change. The arrangement of equipment, piping, cables, etc. tends to consume 
any available space set aside for growth. All disciplines should exercise efficient use of 
the ship’s space in anticipation of changes. 
A model showing the optimal sequencing of ship construction activities and the 
impacts of changes to that sequence could greatly benefit decision-making. The desire to 
outfit the ship with the latest and greatest technology often results in major design 
changes late in the construction phase. A model may help the acquisition community 
make wise choices about which changes are worth the cost and which are not. It may also 
provide insight in setting up the sequencing of work to minimize these types of 
interruptions. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Change Management 
First and foremost, all parties must realize that change is necessary and must be 
managed in a systematic, structured process. Preventative measures should be used where 
possible and countermeasures or mitigation where not. Planning, communication, and 
assessment provide the basic concepts of managing change (Hallock, 2006).  
• Frame the complexity and scope of the project through initial planning and 
formation of processes and procedures 
• Form the contract to communicate how to build the project rather than 
how to defend the contract 
• Conduct a thorough risk assessment 
Informal interviews of the customer indicate a thought pattern that the shipyards 
overestimate the cost of changes. The same types of discussions with shipyard personnel 
point out the difficulties determining the true impact, indicating the sense that changes 
are more often underestimated. In order for all participants truly to understand the 
change, an accurate assessment is an important first step. The assessment should include 
the reasons for the change (error, omission, and change in scope), type of change, 
identification of requestor, and the cost efficiency of the change. 
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A change management process based on best practices may provide the common 
ground needed to ensure all parties are on the same page. The results of a study using 
data collected by the Construction Industry Institution (CII) between 1997 and 2001 
provided 14 best practices for use in change management (Hallock, 2006): 
1. Provide a formal documented change management process to actively 
manage change on the project and ensure the principal project participants 
are familiar with it. 
2. Establish a baseline project scope early and freeze changes made against 
this baseline. 
3. Establish design “freezes” and communicate them once designs are 
complete. 
4. Identify and evaluate areas susceptible to change during review of the 
project design baseline. 
5. Evaluate changes on the project against the business drivers and success 
criteria for the project. 
6. Require all changes go through a formal change justification procedure. 
7. Require mandatory authorization for change prior to implementation. 
8. Ensure timely communication of change information to the proper project 
personnel. 
9. Take proactive measures to promptly reconcile, authorize, and execute 
change orders on the project. 
10. Address criteria for classifying change, authorizing change, including the 
personnel allowed to request and approve, and the basis for adjusting the 
contract. 
11. Set a tolerance level for changes established and communicate it to all 
project personnel. 
12. Process all changes through one owner representative. 
13. Evaluate changes made and their impact on cost and schedule at project 
close-out. Identify lessons learned. 
14. Prior to total budget authorization, organize the project in a Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) format, with quantities assigned to each 
WBS for control purposes. 
The change management process should facilitate the orderly and timely 
processing of justifiable changes. At the same time, unnecessary and/or unjustified 
change should be both, discouraged and prevented. 
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a. Change Prevention 
Prevention starts with early and frequent communication between the 
customer and the contractor. Special attention should be given to details as the parties 
make every effort to understand the requirements. Design reviews should be ongoing 
throughout the program. With open communication, the reviews should surface areas of 
uncertainty or concern. These areas of concern should be resolved at the earliest possible 
time to prevent the compounding affect of instability. 
Knowing each party’s processes provides insight into why something may 
be a problem for one and not the other. It also facilitates the lines of communication and 
understanding required to resolve problems. Analysis of the change, prior to approval, 
should make every effort to capture all impacts to cost and schedule, including any 
indirect affects. An accurate, well-justified business case should be included to 
discourage frivolous change. 
b. Change Mitigation 
Where change is required, the procedures and process should be in place 
to prevent as much disruption as possible. This may mean reserving space and weight for 
systems still under development. The key is understanding each parties processes to 
determine how best to specify the desire or intent during contract design without tasking 
the shipbuilder to perform work that will ultimately lead to rework. 
For example, if an interface is unknown at the time of contract award, it 
should be designated as future or reserved. This is as opposed to designating an interface 
that may change. Without a stop work order, the contractor is obligated to move forward 
with information that is provided contractually, even if the information is stamped 
Preliminary. This may mean the purchase of equipment and cables that are never used, or 
worse, install and ultimately rip-out, for replacement, of the correct equipment and 
cables. 
 104
2. Schedule Flexibility 
How is flexibility added to a schedule constrained by a delivery date, competing 
with the obsolescence of technology? Shipyard build schedules optimize the available 
workforce and capital costs within the constraints of the acquisition milestones. The 
schedules try to provide on-time delivery, at the lowest cost, without disrupting other 
projects. As in any complex schedule, there is available slack time throughout. 
Initially, the design change absorbs the available slack in the schedule. The effects 
are essentially a greedy heuristic where slack is absorbed in a best-fit fashion without full 
optimization. This is a case where optimizing the parts will not necessarily optimize the 
whole. The scheduled slack time on the critical path, however, is minimal. As design 
change absorbs available slack, the critical path starts to lose progress. Depleting non-
critical path slack incurs additional cost. However, critical path slack and time are much 
more costly to consume. Once the critical path is violated, cost grows quickly. 
Programs Managers and shipyards should make improving schedule flexibility a 
priority. Instead of optimizing for economy over the available time, the schedule should 
include an approach to slack that provides greater resilience to design change impacts. 
The shipyards need yard specific schedules, using historical data, developed with modern 
linear programming analysis. This type of built-in resilience encompasses all aspects of 
ship scheduling to include build strategies and producibility. 
At the acquisition level, PMs must account for the effects of design change on the 
schedule. By directing the shipyard to optimize for flexibility, within reason, the PM 
acknowledges the need to provide available program time accommodate potential 
changes. Program milestones define the bracket within which the ship schedule is 
executed. Therefore, the program should provide for the additional schedule time needed 
to optimize the slack time for resilience. This approach provides a greater ability to 
absorb design change without traumatic impacts to the schedule. 
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3. Accommodating Technology Insertion 
Section 4.4.1 of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines an open system as a 
system that employs modular design principle that “uses widely supported and 
consensus-based standards for its key interfaces” (DoDD 5000.1, 2003). It further defines 
“an open systems design as a design approach for developing an affordable and adaptable 
open system” and suggests that the open systems approach should be applied as part of 
the program acquisition overall technical approach (DoDD 5000.1, 2003). 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA), as identified in section 2.3.15 of the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook, is the DoD implementation of open systems (DoDD 
5000.1, 2003) and is recommended for inclusion into the acquisition strategy to ensure 
“access to the latest technologies and products, and to facilitate affordable and 
supportable system development and modernization of fielded assets” (DoDD 5000.1, 
2003). 
MOSA is a strategy for effectively developing new systems or modernizing 
existing ones. It provides a tool that allows members of the acquisition community to 
design for affordable change, use evolutionary acquisition and spiral development, and 
develop an integrated roadmap for weapons systems design development (MOSA, 2004).  
The goals of MOSA is to reduce acquisition cycle time, reuse and standardization of 
system components, leverage of commercial products, and the ability to insert “cutting 
edge technology as it evolves” (MOSA, 2004). 
MOSA consists of five basic principles employed to help realize benefits of open 
system design and lay the foundation for identification of gauges that could, and should, 
be used in acquisition programs. These basic principles are outlined below: 
Principle 1: Establish an Enabling Environment – To achieve this 
objective, all aspects of the acquisition process must be defined and 
structured to support development of an open system with controls in 
place to ensure proper implementation (MOSA, 2004). 
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Principle 2: Employ Modular Design – During the design process, a 
system must be divided into functional components to make it easier to 
develop, maintain, modify or upgrade. To achieve this goal the design 
process must begin with a modular approach with the idea of future 
evolution in mind (MOSA, 2004). 
Principle 3: Designate Key Interfaces – It would not be feasible to attempt 
to manage every interface of a system. Instead, MOSA seeks to group 
interfaces into key and non-key interfaces in an effort to utilize open 
standards for key interfaces where possible (MOSA, 2004). 
Principle 4: Use Open Standards – In order to take advantage of modular 
design and ensure ease of future system changes, “interface standards 
must be well defined, matured, widely used, and readily available”. 
Selection of standards should be base on maturity level, acceptance, and 
allowance for future technology insertion (MOA, 2004). 
Principle 5: Certify Conformance – Verification and Validation processes 
should be in place to ensure conformance to open interfaces that allow 
“plug and play” of system modules. They should also ensure that 
component selection avoids use of vendor unique solutions to interface 
standards (MOA, 2004). 
Adherence to these basic principles ensures that a system has access to the latest 
technology and is easily modifiable and upgradeable to meet future needs. An open 
system design strategy should be an integral part of the Systems Engineering Process. If 
all attempts to prevent design changes fail, the shipyard must plan better to accommodate 
it. Considering that ship design and construction activities are continuing, the primary 
concern should be to expedite implementation of the change. A method for determining 
the probability of approval should be established.  
Changes involving complex systems have the potential to impact several 
seemingly unrelated areas. Analysis identifying highly probable changes should result in 
an immediate stop work order to prevent waste and rework where possible. All potential 
impacts should be identified in this process. The inter-dependencies may be elusive to the 
engineer generating the stop work. Missed impacts are almost guaranteed. 
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4. Future Research 
Several potential research subjects present themselves in this area of study. It is a 
complex and challenging issue. Suggestions for future research include: 
• Decomposition, conversion, and linking of performance requirements to 
ship specifications 
• Evaluating design maturity at Critical Design Reviews 
• Modifying ship construction schedules to improve slack performance for 
change management 
• Improving modularity and reducing density for new naval ships 
With the exception of construction scheduling, all of the suggested subjects relate to 
systems engineering. Most of the issues in design change and rework can be traced to 
systems engineering performance, or lack thereof. 
E. SUMMARY 
The difficulty of design change leading to out-of-sequence work is not new, nor is 
it exclusive to the shipbuilding industry. Over the past 15 years, many studies were 
conducted to assess just about every aspect of the acquisition process. DoD has adopted 
many recommendations and yet programs continue to rush to production with unstable 
designs, ambiguous or unrealistic requirements, and immature technologies. 
The thesis research consistently documents that failure to identify and address 
technical problems and/or provide realistic cost estimates will ultimately lead to 
substantial schedule delays and cost overruns. Three critical knowledge points provide 
direction in achieving a successful outcome. The PM must ensure the criteria for 
answering these knowledge points is met. 
 
The first critical knowledge point relates to requirements and resources. The 
thesis research demonstrates the importance of capturing customer requirements and 
ensuring resources are available to achieve program goals. Requirements must be derived 
from mature and proven technology. Additionally best practices identified by the GAO 
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shows that technology development must be conducted separately from product 
development. This approach reduces program risk and allows for smooth transition 
between program phases. Finally, enough time and funding must be allocated for 
successful program execution. 
The second critical knowledge point ensures the design is capable of meeting 
customer requirements. The design must be stable with a mature technology level prior to 
production. Critical design reviews are performed to ensure the design meets customer 
requirements. Design maturity and technical risk should be assessed during design review 
for all system components. Consensus on design readiness, by all stakeholders, should be 
achieved prior to proceeding to the demonstration phase. 
The third knowledge point ensures that the system can be built within cost and 
schedule prior to manufacturing. Identifying key systems and critical manufacturing 
processes can influence the system’s outcome. Controls should be in place to identify 
gaps in the manufacturing process and correct or improve process prior to production. 
The thesis research illustrates the importance of understanding the design and 
manufacturing processes. Identifying and addressing technical issues early minimizes the 
impact of change on cost and schedule. The complexity and interdependencies can be 
managed with great attention to detail. Failure to address problems early in the process 
results in issues that cascade and grow throughout the development and production phase. 
Issues include increased cost, schedule delays, decreased performance, decreased quality, 
and low employee morale. 
The first step in reversing the trend of inherent rework and out-of-sequence work 
is to enforce existing DoD acquisition policies and hold leadership accountable for their 
proper execution. In addition, DoD must take a holistic approach and develop an 
investment strategy that supports the overall goals of U.S. Defense. This begins by 
developing strategic investment strategies and providing sound business cases for 
programs that aim to achieve strategic goals. 
The next step is to mandate an event driven process as opposed to a schedule 
driven process. Strict evaluation criteria must be in place to ensure dependent events are 
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met prior to proceeding to the next phase. This includes requirements for a Technology 
Maturity Level of 7 or greater for systems and sub-systems under consideration, prior to 
detail design.  
Finally, adequate funding must be provided at inception to support approved 
programs. Program managers must be empowered in a manner that allows successful 
execution of the program. With empowerment comes accountability. Program managers 
must be held accountable for cost, performance, and schedule. 
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